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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the end of 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”)1 went into 
effect, creating new treaty organs that further developed 
international institutional law regarding quasi-international 
organizations.  On September 25, 2014, eight nation states ratified 
the ATT, bringing the total number of supporting states to 50—the 
minimum number of states needed for the ATT to go into effect.2  
The state parties to the ATT do not appear to have wanted to create 
a new international organization to support the treaty, but instead 
created what is commonly known as a “treaty organ” to do the same 
task.  While the creation of an international organization was once 
seen as the best solution, nation states are increasingly sensitive to 
the expense and independence of organizations, and are 
increasingly attracted to the creation of treaty organs.   
Thus, by December 24, 2014, parties to the ATT needed to take 
steps to create the organs for the treaty regime.  In doing so, the state 
parties to the ATT were able to draw on several decades worth of 
experience with treaty organs.  The state parties created two organs:  
the Conference of State parties and the Secretariat.  These kinds of 
entities have been with us in some form or another since at least the 
1970s.   
The emergence of more treaty organs with these entities into the 
already crowded field of organs containing them shows that 
creating treaty organs instead of organizations may now be the 
dominant method for giving effect to bureaucratic regimes.  Even 
though the ATT organs were designed specifically for the start up of 
the ATT, the initial steps taken show that the ATT organs will likely 
continue, and buttress crystallizing international practice on treaty 
organs. 
This article reviews those portions of the ATT text that are 
pertinent to treaty organs that place the new regime into a 
                                                     
1  Arms Trade Treaty, adopted as G.A. Res. 67/234B (Apr. 2, 2013) available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-
01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf [hereinafter ATT]. 
2  See U.N. News Centre, Treaty Regulating Global Arms Trade Set to Enter into 
Force, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48856#.VRf-PjR4p9s 
(last visited March 29, 2015) (“listing the countries that signed the treaty.”).  See also 
Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Arms Trade Treaty Enters Force, Secretary-
General Announces, Urging Rapid Weapons Regulation through Implementation, 
Universalization, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/16201 (Sept. 25, 2014) (discussing the 
enactment of the treaty). 
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comparative study of similar treaty organs.  It will also contribute to 
the scholarship on treaty organs by functionally applying 
international institutional law to such entities.  This approach is not 
merely a wish; rather, it represents the current practice regarding 
these organs, as evidenced through the wide-ranging comparative 
study of the application of international institutional law. 
 
2. THE ORGANS 
 
The ATT creates two treaty organs:  the Conference of States 
Parties (“CSP”)3 and the Secretariat.4 
 
2.1. The Conference of State parties 
 
The creation of CSPs is a growing trend, and is reflected in an 
increasing number of treaties.  Sometimes these treaty bodies are 
termed CSP, other times they are referred to as the Conference of 
Parties (“COP”), “Assembly of States Parties” (“ASP”), “Meeting of 
Parties” (“MOP”) or even “Executive Bureau.”5  This article will 
draw on a comparative study of other CSPs to analyze how CSPs 
generally function and theorize how the ATT CSP will potentially 
function.  This comparative study is appropriate because the state 
parties to the ATT suggested that the CSP model in other treaties 
inspired them.6  With the choice to create a CSP, we can presume 
that the ATT CSP is intended to function like the other CSPs. 
First, we begin with a short background of other CSPs, which are 
not confined to treaties on specific topics.  CSPs have been 
previously created for arms treaties,7 but they have also been created 
                                                     
3  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17.  
4  Id. at art. 18. 
5  For purposes of this article, all similar organs will be referred to uniformly 
as CSPs regardless of their specific designation, however, there may be a few 
instances where this is not the case such as when the organ expressly refers to itself 
by its correct name. 
6  See generally U.N.G.A., Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, Report of 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/62/278 (pt. II) (Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter 
U.N.G.A) 
7  See generally Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 
(No. 47713), art. 11(1) [hereinafter Cluster Munitions Convention]; Convention on 
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under, inter alia, human rights treaties.8  Where CSPs have truly 
flourished is within environmental law treaties.  The first CSP 
(though without using the precise term) in an environmental law 
treaty was in the Ramsar Convention.9  The first treaty to use the 
term “COP” was the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”).10  
Subsequently, a great number of environmental law treaties have 
created CSPs.11  This is not to say that the trend to create new 
international organizations is over—clearly some regulatory 
conventions do create new international organizations.  On the 
contrary, a new trend to create CSPs runs in parallel to those 
                                                     
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, Sep. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36 I.L.M. 1507, 
arts. 8(2), 10(1) [hereinafter Anti-Personnel Mines Convention]; Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 
May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I,L.M. 1523; Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 
[hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]. 
8  See generally U.N. Doc. A/58/422, art. 63; Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, May 3, 2008, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention against 
Corruption, Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. See also Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 
U.N.T.S 166. 
9  See generally Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially 
as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar 
Convention]. 
10  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. 
11  See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; 
Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 
(1994) [hereinafter Desertification Convention]; Convention on Biological 
Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]; 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
849 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 
(1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 19, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol]; Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 
U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention];   Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 1990 U.N.T.S. 
87 [hereinafter Bonn Convention]. 
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organizations.12  Thus, we have a wide practice crossing various 
topics. 
There are several reasons for the growing popularity of CSPs, 
but the primary reason for the growing popularity is most likely the 
increasing treaty compliance and flexibility.  One difficulty with 
many of the older treaties on arms control, and other topics, was the 
fixed nature of the weapons or other items that were included in the 
treaty.13  As a result, when a new technology was developed, a new 
diplomatic conference needed to be convened to address the issue.14  
As a less formal solution, many treaties are now left open-ended 
with a CSP or similar body having the competence to update the 
schedule of items prohibited or controlled.15 
CSPs represent a new approach to the institutional monitoring 
of treaty compliance.  Before CSPs became a feature of some treaties, 
compliance was measured by mutual good faith, which is normally 
the case in treaty relations.16  Over time, practice shifted to creating 
international organizations to monitor treaty operations.17  Within 
each of these organizations, one organ was designated the COP and 
it was explicit that the COP organ would be understood to be the 
principal organ of the organization.18     
                                                     
       12  See infra notes 17–23. 
       13  See, e.g., supra note 7. 
       14  See generally Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7. 
       15  See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1046 UNTS 120, art. 15 (Dec. 29, 1972) [hereinafter 
London Convention]; Bonn Convention, supra note 11; Basel Convention, supra 
note 11; CITES, supra note 10; Montreal Protocol, supra note 11. 
16  See generally Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6. 
17  See General Assembly, Meeting of States Signatories of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Doc. No. 
CTBT/MSS/RES/1 (Nov. 19, 1996), art. 7 [hereinafter Preparatory Commission 
Resolution] (creating the Preparatory Commission as an international organization 
pending the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty); Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty, Sep. 10, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027, 35 ILM 1439, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105, art. 2(B)(24) [hereinafter Test-Ban Treaty]; Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons 
Convention]. 
18  See generally Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 2 (B)(24); Chemical 
Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. 8(B)(19); Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
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However, the practice is now shifting towards establishing CSPs 
only, without the international organization affiliation, with such 
organs often termed “treaty organs.”19  These institutions are not 
merely on-going diplomatic conferences; some are clearly intended 
to add some normative content.  The precise powers of the CSP of 
the ATT and its international legal personality in comparison with 
other CSPs is discussed below. 
With the emergence of CSPs, two major approaches have been 
taken.  The primary trend is to house the CSP in a secretariat of an 
existing international organization where the institutional purposes 
are related.20  Another approach is to delegate CSP-like duties to 
another organization entirely.21  One experiment was to set up the 
treaty body as a subsidiary organ of another international organ 
rather than as an agency.22 
The ATT takes an alternate approach, which is to create a free 
standing CSP, not housed in, or otherwise linked to, an existing 
organization.  This approach is not without precedent.23 
 
 
 
                                                     
19  See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NEILS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 386–87 (4th ed. 2003) (defining “treaty organs”).  For 
examples of CSPs created on the basis of treaties, see COP of the UNFCCC; CMP 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol; 
Conference of the Ramsar Convention. 
20  See generally International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation, Nov. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 733; International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident, Sep. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370, 25 I.L.M. 
1377 (1986); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973); International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; International Plant 
Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 67. 
21  See generally Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used 
for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, Apr. 30, 2010, art. 29. 
22  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. 
Doc. A/8730 at 43, (Dec. 15, 1972) (establishing United Nations Environment 
Program (“UNEP”) as a subsidiary organ of the U.N.G.A.). 
23  See generally Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in 
the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 161 U.N.T.S. 193; African Convention on 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Sep. 15, 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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2.2. The Secretariat 
 
In addition to the CSP, the ATT also creates a Secretariat organ.24  
The creation of a Secretariat organ is another feature increasingly 
typical in various agreements; especially environmental law treaties 
and some arms control treaties.25  However, this is by no means 
universal—many human rights treaties and arms control treaties 
have no secretariat.26 
In addition to a CSP, a Secretariat is a usual organ created to 
support the CSP, the States Parties, and treaty regime itself.  While 
a Secretariat (or Secretariat function) is always an organ of any 
international organization, they are also created to support a regime 
even where no formal international organization is created.27  Often, 
a treaty creates the Secretariat.28  But, in other cases, it is established 
by decision of the CSP,29 or by provisionally establishing a 
Secretariat, with the CSP entrusted to make the body permanent.30  
Even where not initially created by the treaty itself, a Secretariat is 
often created by the state parties later to give administrative support 
to the CSP.31 
Also, similar to the CSP, Secretariats are sometimes placed 
within an existing international organization.32  Although, in at least 
                                                     
24  See ATT, supra note 1, at art 18 (establishing a Secretariat). 
25  See infra notes 26–32. 
26  See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 16; infra note 33 (no 
secretariat). 
27  See, e.g., CITES, supra note 10, at art. XII; Bonn Convention, supra note 11, at 
art. IX. 
28  See generally CITES, supra note 10, at art. XII(1). 
29  See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, Apr. 
10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (discussing state parties created the Implementation 
Support Unit in 2006). 
30  For examples of treaties that had provisional secretariats, see Vienna Ozone 
Convention, supra note 11, art. 7(2); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, at art. 
24(2); UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 8(3); Montreal Protocol, supra note 11. 
31  See, e.g., Preparatory Commission Resolution, supra note 17 (establishing 
secretariat later).  
32  See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 11 (UNFCCC Secretariat within the United 
Nations Secretariat); CITES, supra note 10 (Secretariat within the UNEP Secretariat); 
London Convention, supra note 15 (London Convention Secretariat within the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretariat).  See also Rotterdam 
Convention on Prior Informed Consent, Sep. 10, 1998, 2244 UNTS 337, art. 19(3) 
(Secretariat housed jointly in the UNEP and Food and Agriculture Organization 
Secretariats). 
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one case, a non-governmental organization (“NGO”) provided the 
administrative structure.33  Some treaty regimes dispense with a 
Secretariat entirely, and simply delegate those functions to an 
existing organization.34  The usual reason for housing the Secretariat 
in an existing organization is to benefit from the existing 
organization’s infrastructure, management, prestige, and perhaps 
even subject specific knowledge, avoiding additional costs.  A 
general caution, however, is that the Secretariat of the treaty regime 
may not, by integrating into another Secretariat, avoid express 
limitations on its actions as prescribed in the treaty.35  From time to 
time, there may be a struggle for control of the Secretariat between 
the hosting organization and the treaty regime.  To avoid such 
conflicts, the CSP and hosting organization usually conclude in an 
agreement on the precise scope of control.36  
Turning to the ATT in particular, the treaty merely creates the 
organ and does not provide any guidance on whether it should be 
hosted or affiliated with an existing international organization.37  
During the negotiations, two states expressed the view that the ATT 
Secretariat should be housed within the United Nations.38  Because 
                                                     
33  See The Ramsar Secretariat, RAMSAR, available at http://www.ramsar.org/ 
the-ramsar-secretariat (providing that the Ramsar Convention Secretariat is housed 
within the International Union for the Conservation of Nature administration). 
34  See, e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty, Delegation to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Information Circular No. INFCIRC/810 (Dec. 9, 
2010) (reporting on the Dec, 3 2010 note verbale from Iran transmitting information 
on implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement).  Also note the unusual 
situation of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention involving the Advisory Service 
on International Humanitarian Law of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. 
35  See generally Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 11, at art. 7(2); 
SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at § 33; Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Administrative and Financial Matters Institutional Linkage of the 
Convention Secretariat to the United Nations, 10th Sess., ¶¶ 5, 7–8, 10, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SBI/1999/7 (Apr. 16, 1999). 
36  For examples of control defining agreements see Letter to the President of 
the Climate Change COP from the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (Apr. 
5, 1995), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/5/Add.4, annex; U.N.E.P., The Relationship 
between the Executive Director of UNEP and the Conventions Regarding the 
Administration of Their Secretariats, Fourth Meeting on Coordination of Secretariats of 
Environmental Conventions, U.N. Doc. UNEP/DEP/Coord.4/3/COR.1 1-7, pp 2, 3 
(Jan. 4, 1996). 
37  See generally ATT, supra note 1, at art 17. 
38  See U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Compilations of views on the 
elements of an arms trade treaty: Background document prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.217/2 (May 10, 2012) (response of Poland, sec. VII, Apr. 4, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.N. Secretariat, Compilations of views, May 14 , 2012]; See also 
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the final version of the ATT does not include terms on hosting, we 
might initially expect a Secretariat to be a freestanding body.  
However, at the recent preparatory meetings in Mexico City for the 
first CSP (“CSP1”), the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(“UNODA”) was suggested as the specific host.39  This decision has 
not yet been finalized as there are lingering concerns that housing 
the ATT Secretariat within the UNODA would give the universal 
membership of the U.N. a degree of control over the ATT treaty 
regime which does not have universal membership.40 
 
2.3. The Provisional Secretariat 
 
 One of the options mentioned above that was adopted in case of 
the ATT, is the creation of a “provisional Secretariat” that will only 
convene CSP1 within one year of the entry into force of the ATT, at 
which time the CSP will need to create a permanent Secretariat.41  
 This practice of creating a provisional Secretariat in the treaty (or 
sometimes by decision of the CSP) is typical for the startup of the 
treaty regime operations;42 however, an alternative is to entrust the 
start-up of operations to one state in particular pro tempore.43  
 The CSP will assume supervision of the Secretariat at CSP1 and, 
thereafter, the then permanent Secretariat will convene the annual 
meeting.44  In the negotiations on the ATT, Ukraine proposed that 
only a temporary Secretariat be established and that a permanent 
                                                     
U.N.G.A., Towards an arms trade treaty, 2007, supra note 6, para. 28 (describing the 
response of Argentina). 
39  See S. Bauer, P. Beijer & M. Bromley, The Arms Trade Treaty: Challenges for the 
First Conference of States Parties, SIPRI INSIGHT ON PEACE AND SECURITY NO. 2014/2 (2 
Sep. 2014) [hereinafter Bauer, Beijer & Bromley]. 
40  Id. 
41  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18(1). 
42  For examples of provisional secretariats, see Vienna Ozone Convention, 
supra note 11, at art. 7(2); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, at art. 24(2); 
UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 8(3); Montreal Protocol, supra note 11; CITES, supra 
note 10, at art. XII(1). 
43  See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, 
Nov. 14, 1997, OAS Res. A/53/78, annex, art. XXI(5) reprinted at 22 U.N. 
DISARMAMENT YB, app. III (1997) [hereinafter Inter-American Trafficking 
Convention] (designating a host State Party for each regular meeting as the 
Secretariat pro tempore of the committee until the next meeting). 
44  ATT, supra note 1, at art 17(1). 
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one should be set up only if necessary.45  Currently the preparatory 
meetings for CSP1 are discussing the structure of the provisional 
Secretariat, considering three proposals that envision either housing 
provisional organ in the U.N. Development Programme (“UNDP”) 
or UNODA, or perhaps permitting Mexico to serve as the 
provisional body pro tempore.46  At the Mexico City preparatory 
consultations, the state parties agreed at least to assign Mexico the 
task of producing working papers on the Secretariat, rules of 
procedure, and the funding model for the next preparatory meeting 
prior to CSP1.47   
 
3. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
 
 Especially in cases where the treaty body is administratively 
independent of any other institution, we can wonder whether the 
CSP (or treaty regime generally) is now an international 
organization in its own right.  No CSP in any of the treaties in this 
study is expressly designated as an international organization.  In 
the few cases cited above where a CSP was created within an 
international organization, it was clearly the organization that 
acquired personality, not the organ on its own. 
However, express designation as an international legal person is not 
necessary, and we can find personality implicitly.48   
 Unfortunately, there is no fixed definition of an international 
organization.  The International Law Commission (“ILC”), although 
historically not agreeing to a definition,49 agreed to a definition in 
                                                     
45  See UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General, Towards an arms trade treaty: 
establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of 
conventional arms, U.N. Doc. A/62/278/Add.4, Add. para. 19 (Feb. 15, 2008) (stating 
the response of Ukraine on Feb. 12, 2008). See also U.N.G.A., supra note 6, para. 27 
(stating the response of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Apr. 30, 2007 in considering a 
semi-permanent organ); id. at para. 11 (stating the response of Costa Rica on Apr. 
27, 2007 in considering a semi-permanent organ); id. at para. 26 (stating the response 
of the U.K. in considering a semi-permanent organ). 
46  Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 3.  
47  Id. 
48  See N.D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 27 (1997) 
(describing methods to determine the personality of a treaty). 
49  See, e.g., Summary Record of the Meetings of the Thirty-Seventh Session 6 May-
26 July 1985, YB INT’L L. COMM’N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985, 105-7 (1985) 
(refusing to agree on a definition). 
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2003, though only in the context of the law of responsibility.50  The 
ILC draft articles state that an “international organization” is “an 
organizations established by a treaty or other international 
instrument governed by international law and possessing its own 
international legal personality.”51 Schermers and Blokker found that 
international organizations are “forms of cooperation founded on an 
international agreement creating at least one organ with a will of its 
own, established under international law.”52  This slight difference 
of opinion, however, should not distract us from the underlying 
understanding that organizations only have personality when 
personality is granted to them, though that grant can be implied.53 
 Based on these various definitions, there is some debate over the 
legal personality and nature of CSPs and similar bodies.  Churchill 
and Ulfstein have argued that CSPs are, in essence, international 
organizations and that the principles of international institutional 
law should apply to them.54  The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs 
(“UNOLA”) appears to agree.55  In 1993, the UNOLA concluded that 
the UNFCCC established “an international entity/organization 
with its own separate legal personality, statement of principles, 
                                                     
50  See U.N., 55th Sess., Report of the Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/58/10, at 38 
(2003) (“[A]n organization established by a treaty or other international instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own international legal 
personality.”). 
51  Id. 
52  SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at § 33.  See also C.F. AMERASINGHE, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 44-48 
(1996) (providing how a treaties particular object and purpose assist in its 
interpretaton). 
53  See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: Adv. 
Op., of April 11th, 1949, 1949 I.C.J. Reps. 174, 178-9 (1949)( noting to answer a 
“question, which is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter, we must  consider 
what characteristics it was intended thereby to give to the Organization”).  But see 
F. Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L RET. 1-112 (1964) (arguing that when an organ is 
created with a will of its own, then an international organization exists). 
54  R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International 
Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623, 625, 631–43, 655, 658 (2000). 
55  See UNOLA, Arrangements for the Implementation of the Provisions of Article 11 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change concerning the Financial 
Mechanism – Legal Capacity of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention and the 
Global Environment Facility to Enter into an Agreement or Other Arrangement with Third 
Parties and the Legal Nature of Such Agreement or Arrangement (Nov. 4, 1993), 1993 
U.N. Jurid. YB 427, 428-9, para. 4 [hereinafter UNOLA, Arrangements for 
Implementation 1993] (agreeing with Churchill and Ulfstein). 
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organs and a supportive structure in the form of a Secretariat . . . .”56  
Because the ATT is also established with its own statement of 
principles, organs, and supportive secretariat, we can apply the 
UNOLA’s reasoning to the ATT.  Furthermore, CSPs have been held 
to be able to grant a treaty secretariat international legal personality 
on its own initiative and by its own decision.57 
 Whether the ATT creates an international organization has 
multiple effects, especially in the field of interpretation of the treaty.  
Interpretation has an impact both on the internal institutional 
organization of the treaty body and on the kinds of external relations 
and powers the organ can exercise, as well as their legal effects.58  An 
important result of considering the ATT as creating an international 
organization is that the doctrine of implied powers, ultra vires, and 
the “constitutional” interpretation of the constitutive instrument 
apply.59  Furthermore, entities governed by international 
institutional law can generally influence the interpretation of the 
treaty themselves through their institutional practice.60  Other 
considerations would include the implied power to expel a member 
state from the institution for behavior that is non-conductive to the 
treaty, but not amounting to a material breach under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).61  If, however, principles 
of international institutional law do not apply to these entities, then 
the normal rules of treaties apply (the treaty could be considered 
“self-contained”).62 
                                                     
56  Id. 
57  FCCC, Institutional and Budgetary Matters: Arrangements for Relocation of the 
Convention Secretariat to Bonn, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7, 7, available at 
http://ccsr.aori.u-tokyo.ac.jp/old/unfccc4/lists/list_823.html [hereinafter FCCC, 
Arrangements for Relocation 1996]. 
58  See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.  
59  For examples of international doctrines with implied powers, see U.N. 
Administrative Tribunal ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 79, ¶ 25 (1996); U.N. Administrative Tribunal ICJ, 
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made, Advisory Opinion of 1954, I.C.J. 47, 53 (1954). 
60  See, e.g., U.N. Security Council, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advanced Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (1970) (stating 
Namibia’s advanced opinion). 
61  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
art. 60(2) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
62  U.S. Dipl. & Cons. Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. 3, 39-41 
(1980). 
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 Certainly, the ATT CSP is established by a form of cooperation, 
for example an international agreement under international law.63   
The ATT CSP has a will of its own, as no state or international 
organization can instruct it.64  However, at least one state specifically 
intended not to create a new international organization.65  While this 
one statement is not determinative, it does show that there was no 
unanimous intention to create an international organization. 
 Some authors have taken a middle ground on CSPs.  Schermers 
and Blokker conclude that these kinds of entities are “intermediate 
forms between independent organizations and organs of 
organizations.”66  Because some treaty organs often have no 
secretariat and no legal personality, the International Law 
Association concluded that they were “incomplete international 
organizations.”67  Indeed, this conclusion is the best view, but it 
must be conditioned on the fact that different CSPs are structured 
differently with varying limitations on their independence, and 
given that they are at least partly international organizations, it is 
difficult to know which part(s) of international institutional law 
apply.  Other CSPs have ranged in their independent will from ones 
that were very independent to those that carefully limited 
themselves to the intent of the parties.68 
                                                     
63  The ATT is a treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
See generally ATT, supra note 1; VCLT, supra note 61.  
64  F. Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental 
Organizations, 34 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L RET, 47 (1964) (arguing that “will” 
means it is not instructed by any single state). 
65  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t St., Arms Trade Treaty: United States Signs Arms Trade 
Treaty on September 25, 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ 
armstradetreaty/index.htm [hereinafter USDOS, U.S. Signs ATT] (“Key U.S. 
Redlines in the Negotiations . . . There will be no mandate for an international body 
to enforce an ATT.” . . . “Parameters” . . . “No new international organization should 
be created to enforce an ATT. Exports will ultimately be a national decision.”). 
66  SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at §§ 44, 386–387. 
67  Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, First Report, 
INTL L. ASSOC., 5 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter ILA First report]. 
68  See generally B. Siebenhüner, The Biodiversity Secretariat: Lean Shark in 
Troubled Waters, F. BIERMAN & B. SIEBENHÜNER EDS., MANAGERS OF GLOBAL CHANGE: 
THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES 265, 284 (2009); 
S. Bauer, The Desertification Secretariat: A Castle Made of Sand, F. BIERMAN & B. 
SIEBENHÜNER EDS., MANAGERS OF GLOBAL CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES 293, 300 (2009); P-O Busch, The 
Climate Secretariat: Making a Living in a Straitjacket, MANAGERS OF GLOBAL 
CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES 245, 
261. 
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 Turning specifically to the ATT CSP, of course it will remain to 
be seen whether the ATT CSP takes a liberal or conservative 
interpretation of the organ’s nature, but experience with other 
bodies suggests an approach somewhere in between those two 
extremes.  While some states expressed views on their vision for the 
ATT CSP, most states did not.69  Thus, the CSP, much like other 
CSPs, appears to be an international treaty-based institution whose 
membership appears to deny it full international legal personality.  
The arms control treaties, however, are generally convened by the 
U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretariat functions as the 
treaty secretariat.70 These bodies also do not generally have 
subsidiary bodies.71  This stands in contrast to the ATT, which has 
its own secretariat and its own mechanism for convening, and the 
parties report directly to it.72  What also remains unclear about the 
CSP of the ATT is the degree to which it develops normative content.  
Most other arms control treaties are limited to considering 
amendments to the treaty, but which have to be adopted at a 
separate diplomatic conference.73  The ATT CSP also has this process 
of considering amendment for adoption at a review conference, but 
it has additional functions regarding review of implementation, 
which suggests that it resembles one of the environmental law CSPs 
more than a classic arms control CSP.74  In addition, the arms control 
treaties that go farther than mere diplomatic conferences tend to 
                                                     
69  See, e.g., UNGA, Report by the Secretary-General, Towards an arms trade 
treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of 
conventional arms, UNGA 62d sess. U.N. Doc. A/62/278, pt. II, (Aug. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, 2011] (stating the response of 
Switzerland, June 2, 2011 where Switzerland viewed the CSP as acting as an 
“information broker” to collate and analyze information about the treaty). 
70  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Land Mine Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8; 
UNODA, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, available at http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/convarms/landmines/article7/ (functioning as the treaty 
secretariat).  
71  Anti-Personnel Land Mine Convention Implementation Support Unit, 
available at http://www.apminebanconvention.org/implementation-support-
unit/activities/overview/. 
72  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(3)(a).  See also id., at art. 5(4), 11(6), 13(1), 13(2), 
13(3). 
73  Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(16), (17). 
74  See, e.g., CITES, supra note 10, at art. XI(3); Bonn Convention, supra note 11, 
at art. VII(5); Basel Convention, supra note 11, at art. 15(5); UNFCCC, supra note 11, 
at art. 7(2)(e-g); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 10, at art. 23(4) (comparing ATT 
CSP to environmental law CSPs). 
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establish true international organizations.75  Because the ATT did 
not go so far, then it must be intended to fall into the middle ground 
between international organization and diplomatic conference, 
again, suggesting the model developed for environmental law 
treaties. 
 Clearly the ATT CSP is intended to be more formal than an ad 
hoc diplomatic conference, yet less formal than a true international 
organization.  Based on the practice applied to other CSPs to date, 
the author will apply principles of international institutional law 
only to the degree to which the ATT CSP and its Secretariat function 
as international institutions.76  It appears that States Parties do 
intend for at least some minimal aspects of CSPs to function 
similarly.77  Thus, for example, when the CSP acts, especially when 
interpreting the ATT, we might presume that it acts intra vires.  In 
this respect, ATT article 17(4)(g) (“[p]erform any other function 
consistent with [the ATT]”) is important in conjunction with article 
17(4)(d) (“[c]onsider issues arising from the interpretation of [the 
ATT]”) in that it appears to provide the CSP with considerable 
flexibility in how it views its own tasks.  We might also view the CSP 
as having a role in reviewing subsequent membership as per the 
VCLT, especially if new States Parties wish to enter reservations to 
the ATT.  Therefore, this article will apply general principles of 
international institutional law where the CSP more closely 
resembles a normal international institution, but will more heavily 
rely on the law of treaties where the CSP is more unique. 
 In addition, or in the alternative, we can wonder whether the 
ATT Secretariat would enjoy its own international legal personality 
distinct from the CSP.  It is not unheard of for a secretariat of the 
treaty regime to have international personality.  This grant can come 
                                                     
75  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17; Test-Ban Treaty, 
supra note 17 (establishing international organizations).  
76  See generally Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 174. 
77  See U.N.G.A., supra note 6, at para. 27 (stating the response of Argentina, 
implying that the experience with other COPs inspired the proposal to create an 
ATT COP). 
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from the express terms of the constitutive instrument78 or by a 
decision of the CSP,79 or even through a headquarters agreement.80  
Because the ATT treaty regime does have a Secretariat, it satisfies 
at least one of the two elements that the International Law 
Association considers are necessary for a treaty regime organization 
to be an international organization.81  Just as with the CSP, the ATT 
does not include any express terms on personality for the 
Secretariat, so the grant of personality will either need to be 
understood as implied in the ATT or the CSP will need to take some 
action granting or confirming that personality. 
That being said, it is possible that the CSP’s or Secretariat’s 
nature might evolve over time.  Treaty organs are still a relatively 
recent phenomenon in international law.  They can be seen as part 
of a move away from more formal institutions towards informal 
mechanisms that are seen to be more effective.  Consider, for 
example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).82  
When the GATT was first adopted in 1947, the vision was to also 
create an International Trade Organization.83  However, that effort 
was unsuccessful until the creation of the World Trade Organization 
in 1994.  Thus, between 1947 and 1994 the GATT operated, certainly 
not by design, as an informal organization directed by regular 
meetings of the parties, a secretariat, and subsidiary bodies.84  It 
evolved informally to the point where the meetings of the parties 
continued the normative development of the GATT and the 
                                                     
78  See, e.g., UNOLA, Arrangements for Implementation 1993, supra note 55, at 
para. 4 (“[A]n international entity/organization with its own separate legal 
personality, statement of principles, organs and a supportive structure in the form 
of a Secretariat”). 
79  See FCCC Arrangements for Relocation 1996, supra note 57, at 7, 11(5) 
(granting secretariat an international personality by a decision of the CSP). 
80  See FCCC, Administrative and Financial Matters Establishment of the Permanent 
Secretariat and Arrangements for its Functioning, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/ 1996/MISC.1, 
art. 4(1) (granting international personality through a headquarters agreement). 
81  See Int’l L. Assoc., Committee on Accountability of International 
Organizations, First report 5 (Feb. 1998) (listing elements that make a treaty regime 
an international organization). 
82  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
83  See generally S.J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade 
Organization, 63 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1949). 
84  See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 1035 (6th 
ed. 1994) (describing organizational history of the GATT).  
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subsidiary bodies monitored implementation and compliance.85  A 
similar evolution may take place for the ATT organs over the 
coming fifty years. 
 
4. CONVENING 
 
To begin operations, the CSP must first be convened.  Under 
ATT article 17(1), CSP1 will be called by the Secretariat, having itself 
only been provisionally formed.86  Article 17(2) requires that this 
first meeting of the CSP be convened no later than one year 
following the entry into force of the ATT.87  The schedule for further 
meetings is at the discretion of the CSP.88 
At this point, CSP1 is planned to take place in August 2015.  The 
precise date is planned to not conflict with other significant arms 
control meetings, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference scheduled for April and May 2015, and to allow 
sufficient time to prepare and permit additional states to adhere to 
the ATT.   
Because of the needed urgency, the state parties decided to 
convene two preparatory conferences prior to CSP1.89  The first 
preparatory meeting for CSP1 was in Port-of-Spain on February 23-
24, 2015 and the second was in Geneva on 6-8 July 2015.90  All 
signatories to the ATT were invited to these meetings, as were select 
                                                     
85  See Decision of the Contracting Parties, Differential and More Favorable 
Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 
1979), B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 203 (1980) (describing normative evolution of GATT).  
86  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(1). 
87  Id.  
88  Id. 
89  See Virginia Gamba, Looking Ahead: Entry into Force and the First Conference 
of State Parties: Current State of Play and Preparations for the Conference of State Parties 
in Mexico at the British Group Inter-Parliamentary Union, U.N. Off. for Disarmament 
Aff’rs, London (Nov. 3–5, 2014), at 4, available at https://unoda-
web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ipu-revvg.pdf 
[hereinafter UNODA Gamba, Looking Ahead] (noting that, at the time of writing, 
a meeting had already been held  in Mexico, another would be held in Berlin, and 
that other governments had offered to host both “informal and formal” additional 
meetings “as needed during 2015.”). 
90  See UNODA, First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty 
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/csp1/. Also id. (describing 
the informal consultations in Mexico City on September 8-9, 2014; Berlin on 
November 27-28, 2014; and Vienna on April 20-21, 2014). 
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NGOs.91  Thus, the voice of states that have signaled intention to 
adhere to the ATT but have not yet done so will be considered in 
shaping the operations, and make for a more successful regime.  
Mexico has further offered to host CSP1,92 and will serve as chair of 
the preparatory meetings.93 
Once convened, the CSP will direct the (then permanent) 
Secretariat to convene meetings periodically.94  This practice of 
periodic meetings is common to many CSPs, especially CSPs dealing 
with environmental law issues or functioning as an organ of a true 
international organization.95  This practice is historically uncommon 
among arms control treaties CSPs, which are usually convened only 
on an as-needed basis by the U.N. Secretariat or agency 
administering them,96 or by the CSP itself for special sessions.97  This 
is, of course, a generality only.  Furthermore, a trend may be 
emerging for even arms control treaties to provide for periodic 
meetings.98  The fact that the ATT must have periodic meetings is 
unusual in this regard and points to its special nature. 
Article 17(1) further provides that the CSP shall meet at other 
times decided by the CSP.99  For example, article 17(5) explicitly 
permits the CSP to call special “[e]xtraordinary meetings.”100  There 
are two possible triggers for an extraordinary meeting:  either when 
the CSP determines that such a meeting is necessary, or when a state 
                                                     
91  Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 3. 
92  Mex. MFA, Mexico welcomes, supra note 63. 
93  See Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 3 (stating Mexico City will 
serve as chair). 
94  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(1). 
95  See Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(14) and (15) (noting that  
“[t]he Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, 
unless it decides otherwise” and providing for additional rules permitting special 
sessions of the Conference to be called). 
96  See Cluster Munitions Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11(1) (setting out that 
“[t]he States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where 
necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application 
or implementation of this Convention”). 
97  See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(B)(12) (noting 
that special sessions of the Conference to the Convention may be convened in 
various circumstances, including “[w]hen decided by the Conference”). 
98  See Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XXI 
(noting, for example, that the “Consultative Committee” to the Convention “shall 
hold one regular meeting each year”). 
99  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(1). 
100  Id. at art. 17(5). 
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party requests such a meeting in writing with the agreement of two-
thirds of the States Parties.101  The CSP will also have the power to 
create subsidiary organs.102  However, the ATT does not specify 
when any subsidiary organs would meet, whether future meetings 
would be periodic or on an as-needed basis, or whether those 
meetings would occur at the same time as meetings of the CSP.103 
The only decision the CSP must take at its first meeting is to 
decide on rules of procedure, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.104  However, the CSP would be wise to also address 
important logistic issues, such as the structure and financing of the 
Secretariat and future meetings, in order to not unnecessarily 
impede the operation of the ATT, and to make for a more effective 
Secretariat.  In addition, the first CSP might also consider 
developing national reporting templates and a plan of work to 
ensure that the momentum of the ATT is not lost.  By way of 
contrast, the practice of the CSP of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions was to postpone important funding decisions for the 
implementation support unit,105 and it appears that momentum to 
reach agreement may have been lost as a result.  
 
                                                     
101  Id. 
102  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4)(f). 
103  In addition, some CSPs have created subsidiary organs that might convene 
separately or contemporaneously with the principal organ.  See UNFCCC 
Convention Bodies: Conference of the Parties, available at http://unfccc.int/ 
essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.php (“The 
SBSTA [Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice] and the SBI 
[Subsidiary Body for Implementation] have traditionally met in parallel, at least 
twice a year. When they are not meeting in conjunction with the COP, the 
subsidiary bodies usually convene at the seat of the secretariat.”).  But, there does 
not appear to be a requirement that this be the case here. 
104  ATT, supra note 1, at art 17(2). 
105  See, e.g., Cluster Munitions Convention CSP, Non-paper submitted by the 
coordinators on general status and operation of the Convention on the subject of resource 
mobilization for the financing of the future ISU (Jan. 2014) available at http://www. 
clusterconvention.org/files/2014/01/Non-paper-financing-of-ISU-Coordinators-
on-General-Status-and-Operation-of-the-Convention.pdf [hereinafter Cluster 
Munitions CSP, Non-paper] (“At the 4th MSP, States Parties agreed that the issue 
of the funding model for the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) be deferred to the 
5MSP, but that consultations on the issue of the funding model will be ongoing.”); 
Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 3 (“The 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM) entered into force in 2010, but states are still trying to agree a 
funding model for the treaty’s implementation support unit (ISU).”).  
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4.1. Representatives 
 
The ATT does not provide any terms or provisions on the 
representatives to the CSP.  This is unfortunate, since most other 
treaties creating CSPs do provide this direction.106  However, the 
practice of the ATT will most likely follow those other CSPs.  CSPs 
and similar organs commonly permit one representative from each 
state.107  It is typical for each representative to be accompanied by 
advisors and experts.108  
It is also not clear how the CSP will evaluate the credentials of 
representatives.  It is the frequent practice of international 
organizations to form a sub-committee for this purpose or delegate 
this function to the Secretariat.109 
 
4.2. Observers 
 
Similarly, the ATT is silent in relation to observers to the CSP.  
Some CSPs permit observers,110 with some going so far as to permit 
observer participation.111  For example, some environmental law 
                                                     
106  For examples of treaties with provisions, see Inter-American Trafficking 
Convention, supra note 43, at art. XXI(1); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 
17, at art. VIII(B)(9); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(12); Ramsar 
Convention, supra note 9, at art. 7(2). 
107  See Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XXI(1) 
(“The Consultative Committee shall consist of one representative of each State 
Party.”); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(B)(9) (noting that 
“[e]ach member shall have one representative in the Conference”); Test-Ban Treaty, 
supra note 17, at art. II(B)(12) (similarly providing that “[e]ach State Party shall have 
one representative in the Conference”); Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, at art. 7(2) 
(noting that “[e]ach of the Contracting Parties represented at a  
Conference shall have one vote”).  
108  Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(B)(9). 
109  See, e.g., CITES Sixty-fifth meeting of the Standing Committee, Geneva 
(Switzerland), 7-11 July 2014, SC summary record, at 11.2,  available at 
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/65/E-SC65-SumRec-
DRAFT-08.04.15.pdf (providing “guidance” on evaluating submission of 
credentials).  See generally 1971 U.N, Jurid. YB at 219. 
110  See Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11(4) (noting that 
various non-parties “may be invited to attend . . . meetings as observers”); Cluster 
Munitions Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11(3) (similarly permitting various non-
parties to be invited to attend such meetings). 
111  See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 13(2); CITES, supra note 
10, at art. XI(7). 
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CSPs permit non-state actor observer participation.112  It is likely that 
the ATT CSP will adopt the normal practice of international 
institutions and provide itself the discretion to admit observers. 
Practice to date, in relation to the preparatory meetings for the CSP, 
supports this conclusion.113  Certainly, state and international 
organization actors, as well as International Committee of the Red 
Cross, could be observers, as could other reputable civil society 
organizations.  The difficulty for the CSP will be determining which 
organizations should be invited and in particular, whether weapons 
manufacturers or other non-state actors should be included.  The 
initial practice developing at the preparatory meetings has been to 
exclude arms manufacturers.114  However, this is likely due to the 
fact that the civil society participants were organized by an arms 
control organization rather than the arms industry, which may limit 
the precedent value of this approach to date. 
Subsidiary body organs may have different rules on observers, 
sometimes accrediting them together with the CSP or, in other cases, 
accrediting them separately.  Similarly, different rules may apply in 
                                                     
112  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at arts. 13(2) and 13(8) (permitting 
“[p]arties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol” to participate as 
observers in the proceedings of session of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.”); UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 7(6) 
(“The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to the 
Convention… Any body or agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the 
Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at 
a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer . . . .”); CITES supra note 10, 
at art. XI(7) (permitting non-state parties, suitably qualified, to be admitted at 
meetings of the Conference unless at least one-third of Parties object). See also Arms 
Trade Treaty Legal Response Network, Survey of Rules of Procedure for Conferences of 
States Parties Governing International Treaties, available at 
http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/Survey-of-
Participation-Rules-of-Procedure-for-CSP.pdf (discussing “participation in the 
Meetings or Conferences of States Parties as set forth in the CSP Rules of Procedure 
for each treaty.”). 
113  See Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 2-3 (“Meeting invitations will 
be extended to those governments that have signed or ratified the ATT and NGOs 
that have played a role in promoting it.”). 
114  See Rachel Stohl, First Formal Arms Trade Treaty Preparatory Meeting Held in 
Port of Spain, Trinidad Stimson Center, (Mar. 2, 2015), 
available at http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/first-formal-arms-trade-treaty- 
preparatory-meeting-held-in-port-of-spain-trinidad/ (“Specifically, the United 
States wanted to allow industry and civil society organizations that did not support 
the object and purpose of the ATT to participate in the meetings, which — under  
the process established by Mexico— was not permitted.").   
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relation to the participation of observers.  In certain environmental 
law CSPs that are created by a separate protocol, the CSP of the 
initial treaty is only permitted to implement the protocol.115  This 
means that parties to the protocol who are not parties to the initial 
treaty may only participate as observers when the CSP of the initial 
treaty is not acting in its capacity as CSP of the protocol.116  Of 
course, these issues will only arise if the ATT CSP creates subsidiary 
bodies or the States Parties adopt protocols to the ATT. 
 
4.3. Staff 
 
It will be helpful at this point to comment on the staffing issue 
of the Secretariat.  In contrast to the political organ of the CSP, the 
Secretariat is generally understood to be an independent organ 
staffed by international civil servants.117  The U.N. Secretariat 
remains the model secretariat for staffing practices; the general 
practice among other secretariats is to follow U.N. recruitment, 
staffing and human resources policies, 118 such as promotion and 
salary.119  Independence of staff does not mean that these employees 
will be unaccountable to the political organs; rather, their 
independence requires that they answer to all of the States Parties 
                                                     
115  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 13(1) (“The Conference of the 
Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol.”). 
116  See id. at art. 13(2) (noting that “[p]arties to the Convention that are not 
Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers” at conferences under the 
Protocol but decisions may only be taken by parties). 
117  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(D)(46), 
(47) (“Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the 
responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of 
the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.”); 
Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(D) (52) (relevantly noting that “[i]n the 
performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection 
assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from 
any Government or from any other source external to the Organization” and shall 
refrain from taking any actions “that might reflect adversely on their positions”). 
118  See T.G. Weiss, International Bureaucracy: The Myth and Reality of the 
International Civil Service, 58 INT’L AFF’RS 287–89, 293 (1982) (noting that one of the 
pressures faced by international officials is achieving geographical balance among 
the staff). 
119  See U.N., International Civil Service Commission, Common System 
Members, available at http://icsc.un.org/about/members.asp (providing 
information on the U.N. Secratariat’s structure). 
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jointly120 and perhaps in an even more abstract way, the Secretariat 
is accountable to the treaty regime generally.121  
 The ATT states that the Secretariat will be “adequately staffed” 
and work within a “minimized structure” to fulfill its 
responsibilities.122  In addition, the employees must “have the 
necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively 
undertake [its] responsibilities.”123  These terms set up a need for a 
careful balance between having as small of a Secretariat as possible 
and empowering the Secretariat such that it is able to discharge its 
duties under the ATT, as well as potentially any other duties or tasks 
assigned to the Secretariat by the CSP.  It is possible for a Secretariat 
to be quite small and function effectively,124 though size has a clear 
link to the ability of the treaty organ to adopt a more or less proactive 
position. 
As for leadership, most secretariats have an officer or council 
that heads the bureaucracy.125  The ATT does not specify how the 
leadership should be structured or even what the title of the officer 
should be.  To date, two states have proposed candidates for “Head” 
of the Secretariat.126 
 
                                                     
120  See Weiss, supra note 120, at 288-89 (“Each international official is expected 
to approach decision-making objectively, taking into account the opinions of all 
nations and the impact of any decision upon the globe as a whole.”). 
121  See J. DEPLEDGE, THE ORGANIZATION OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS: 
CONSTRUCTING THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 65-6 (2005) (relevantly noting that the 
Secretariat must be impartial while “[f]undamentally” serving two masters, acting 
both “as the guardian of the climate change regime” while also being “subservient 
to, and dependent on, the will of the parties, having been established to serve 
them.”). 
122  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18(2–3). 
123  Id. at art. 18(2). 
124  After all, the Convention on Conventional Weapons has a staff of two.  See 
Tim Caughley, Report to the Open-Ended Task Force on the Implementation Support Unit 
60 (Sept. 1, 2010) available at http://www.apminebanconvention.org/ 
fileadmin/APMBC/ISU/ISU-Evaluation-Final-1Sept2010.pdf (discussing the 
effectiveness of the ISU of the Mine Ban Convention). 
125  Typically, secretariats have either a Secretary-General or Director-General. 
At other times, there is an Executive Council.  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons 
Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(C); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(C) 
(noting the creation of an Executive Council in the Test-Ban Treaty). 
126  See Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 30, at 5 (describing Finland and 
Sweden’s “proposed candidates for Head of [the] Secretariat”). 
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4.4. Seat 
 
Perhaps significantly, the ATT CSP and Secretariat have no 
headquarters or permanent seat designated in the treaty. 
This practice is not unusual for CSPs,127 in keeping with their 
more “informal status.”128  True international organizations have a 
fixed headquarters.129  Even CSPs hosted by an existing international 
organization will necessarily have a permanent headquarters 
insofar as the secretariat serving the organ already has a permanent 
seat.130  Independent CSPs are not limited in this way.  One 
advantage of this structure is that the CSP can rotate its meetings or 
convene at a location more relevant for the topics on the agenda. 
However, it is left unclear whether the CSP or the Secretariat will 
determine the site of the next meeting.  Some treaties expressly 
provide that the CSP may determine its places of meeting,131 but the 
ATT is silent.  It might be implied that the CSP determines its place 
of meeting by reading the provisions in ATT article 17 on the power 
to control the manner of meeting, specifically paragraphs 3 (budget 
decisions) and 5 (time of meetings).  Also, it could be understood to 
reside in the power of the CSP by comparison to the normal practice 
of CSPs as the principal organ of the treaty regime.132  Regardless of 
which organ takes up this task, the selection of the meeting site 
might become a leverage point in securing the implementation of 
and compliance with the ATT; hosting the meeting can serve as a 
reward for compliance.  Thus, in keeping with the specific tasks 
allocated to the organs, it might be better practice for this, seemingly 
mundane, item to be on the CSP agenda even though the ATT 
appears to contemplate that the permanent Secretariat will convene 
future meetings. 
                                                     
127  See generally Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11; 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 7, at art. 11; CITES, supra note 10, at 
art. XII. 
128  See International Legal Personality, supra note 50 (describing the informal 
structure of certain CSPs). 
129  See, e.g., Preparatory Commission Resolution, supra note 33, at art. 3; 
Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(A)(3) (noting the location 
of the headquarters/seat of the organization). 
130  See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
131  See generally Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. 
XXI (3-5). 
132    See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(24)(“The Conference 
shall be the principal organ of the Organization.”). 
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As of the time of this writing, the States Parties had not yet 
determined the seat of the Secretariat.  While the CSP might not need 
a fixed seat, it is very impractical for the Secretariat not to have one.  
There are a wide variety of considerations for where to best locate 
it, ranging from a city with a large number of established 
international organizations and well-developed infrastructure to a 
location outside of the usual “UN city” network that might provide 
better geographic distribution and be closer to areas of concern.  In 
the preparatory meetings leading up to CSP1, three states have 
submitted formal offers to host the Secretariat:  Austria, 
Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago.133  Another option might be 
to have geographically distributed regional centers that could be 
closer to areas of concern, with the headquarters in a more familiar 
city.134 
 
5. RULES OF PROCEDURE 
 
One of the first tasks of the CSP upon being convened is to adopt 
its rules of procedure.  Here again the ATT is not entirely clear about 
any specific rules of procedure, apparently leaving the issue to the 
CSP.135  However, permitting the CSP to decide on its own rules of 
procedure is a typical practice of treaty regimes.136 
The ATT only specifies rules of procedure for adopting the rules 
of procedure.  Article 17(2) provides that the rules of procedure shall 
be adopted by consensus.137  Other than this first act of adopting 
                                                     
133    Bauer, Beijer & Bromley, supra note 39, at 5. 
134  See Weiss, supra note 120, at 302 (discussing the potential benefits of 
decentralizing international institutions’ operations).  See id. (“Decentralisation 
could also counterbalance the increasing bureaucratic depersonalisation so 
characteristic of large societies and institutions. International secretariats could 
encourage grass-roots participation and initiate small-scale projects in many parts 
of the world, in which the final decision-making authority would be vested in 
global civil servants in the field and local communities rather than in staff at 
headquarters.”). 
135  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(2). 
136  For examples of other treaty regimes where the CSP determines its own 
rules of procedure, see Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. 
XXI(7) (“The Consultative Committee shall prepare its own internal rules of 
procedure and shall adopt them by absolute majority”); Preparatory Commission 
Resolution, supra note 33, at art. 8 (“The Commission shall…adopt its rules of 
procedure…”); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(B)(13). 
137  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(2). 
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rules of procedure, however, the ATT provides no requirements for 
how decisions are to be taken in the future, so this first decision will 
be crucial for how the CSP effectively pursues its tasks. 
There was not much feedback from states on their views on the 
eventual rules of procedure for the ATT CSP. The only formal 
suggestion submitted was the intervention of Mauritania—
submitted on behalf of the League of Arab States—that suggested 
that decisions of the five-year review process, though not 
necessarily decisions by the CSP, must be based on consensus.138  
The disadvantage of consensus, however, is that it is poorly defined 
in international institutional law and could be a means to prevent 
decision-making.139 
In terms of the probable rules of procedure, the ATT CSP is not 
likely to re-invent the wheel.  The norm for environmental law CSPs 
is for all states to be represented, speak, and vote equally.140  Certain 
states have adopted a negative consensus method by which states 
are bound unless they opt out.141  Other CSPs, on the other hand, 
reach decisions primarily using consensus,142 though permitting 
voting should consensus not be possible.143 
                                                     
138  See U.N. Secretariat, Compilations of views, May 10, 2012, supra note 38, at 
para. 7 (stating the response of Mauritania on behalf of the League of Arab States). 
139  See Report of the sixth meeting of the COP to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, (May 27, 2002), paras. 294-324, ann. 
I (illustrating that not only can it be difficult to reach consensus, there can be 
varying understandings of what “consensus” means).  See also Ray Acheson & 
Beatrice Fihn, The Failure of Consensus, No. 6.10 ARMS TRADE TREATY MONITOR (Mar. 
29, 2013), available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ 
images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/monitor/ATTMonitor6.10.pdf, 1–2 
(discussing the use of consensus to prevent decision-making at the Conference on 
Disarmament). 
140  See, e.g., CITES, supra note 10, at art. XI(7) (outlining representation); 
Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, at art. 7(2) (“Each of the Contracting Parties 
represented at a Conference shall have one vote, recommendations being adopted 
by a simple majority of the votes cast, provided that not less than half the 
Contracting Parties cast votes.”). 
141  See generally Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 UNTS 217 [hereinafter LRTAP Convention]. 
142  See Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8(6) (“The 
Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make 
every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no 
agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties 
present and voting.”). 
143  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(22); Preparatory 
Commission Resolution, supra note 33, at art. 6; Chemical Weapons Convention, 
supra note 17, at art. VIII(B)(18), Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at 
art. 8(6). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/4
WORSTER 9/24/2015  4:06 PM 
2015] ARMS TRADE TREATY REGIME 1023 
Procedural issues, though, often do not require consensus, and 
can range from two-thirds to simple majority, perhaps with a 
weighing mechanism.144  The distinction between procedural and 
substantive issues then also needs to be specified, and significant 
issues such as the agenda, amendments to be tabled for 
consideration, establishing subsidiary organs and shifting from 
consensus building to voting on the merits can be considered 
procedural. 
 
6. FINANCING 
 
With rules of procedure in place, the CSP must adopt financial 
rules under article 17(3).  These rules will cover the ATT CSP,145 the 
Secretariat,146 and any subsidiary bodies created later.147  In addition 
to preparing the funding rules, the CSP will also establish the annual 
budget for itself148 and the Secretariat.149  The Secretariat does not 
have independent budget powers.150 
One of the less noticed strengths of treaty bodies over true 
international organizations is their cost.  It cannot be overlooked that 
international organizations generally require large headquarters 
and sometimes branch offices, large staff with international 
relocation, training and pension obligations, translation services, 
                                                     
144  See, e.g., Biodiversity Convention, Rule 40(1) of the Rules of Procedure, 
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17, ann. III (Jan. 1995) (requiring that parties make 
every effort to ensure that decisions are unanimous or, if not unanimous consensus 
is not possible, that decisions are approved by a two-thirds majority); UNFCCC, 
Draft Rules, Rule 42, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/2; (May 22, 1996) (providing that 
it is not necessary for the parties have unanimous support for convention actions); 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/6, 
¶ 14, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ cop5/06.htm (allowing 
procedural changes to be instated without consensus).  
145  See ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(3) (“The Conference of States Parties shall 
adopt financial rules for itself . . .”). 
146  See id. (“[The CSP] shall adopt financial rules . . . governing the functioning 
of the Secretariat . . .”). 
147  See id. (“[The CSP] shall adopt financial rules . . . governing the funding of 
any subsidiary bodies it may establish . . .”). 
148  See id. (“At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a budget for the financial 
period until the next ordinary session.”). 
149  See id. at art. 17(4)(e) (“[The CSP] shall consider and decide the tasks and 
budget of the Secretariat.”).  
150  Id. 
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security, etc.151  Of course, the reverse can be true for a moveable 
place of meeting, as the costs of transporting secretariat functions 
can be considerable, depending on the institution.152  The preference 
to avoid new expensive bureaucracies is part of the reason for the 
growth in treaty regimes,153 so it can be assumed that the ATT CSP 
will adopt financial rules that seek to minimize costs, and this 
interest might influence other choices such as the headquarters of 
the CSP and Secretariat. 
Some treaties provide for a financing structure,154 but the ATT 
does not.  This omission of financial rules in the ATT means that a 
great number of financing issues remain unresolved, including the 
costs of meetings and all of the activities of the CSP and other 
organs, and it means that the parties have no agreement on the 
method by which costs will be allocated.  The options include 
voluntary contributions or mandatory assessments (fixed or 
varying, equal or proportional), or an approach combining the two 
(such as mandatory assessments for the Secretariat and voluntary 
contributions for various projects directed by the CSO, etc.).  These 
issues are in turn linked to the structure of the organs themselves.  
For example, embedding the treaty organs into an existing 
organization could be significantly cheaper than a freestanding 
organ.155 
As noted above, there is no provision on how this decision on 
financial rules shall be made.  In addition, article 17(3) provides that 
the CSP shall have the authority to adopt the operating budget for 
the financial period until the next meeting of the CSP.156  Since the 
                                                     
151  See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at §§ 925-936 (describing the 
various needs of international organizations to function correctly). 
152  See id. at § 487 (discussing the strengths of having a mobile headquarters 
as opposed to one that is fixed). 
153  See Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the 
Environment: An Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
34-5 (1992) [hereinafter Hurrell & Kingsbury] (“[T]he dominant view among states 
is that to meet new environmental needs over the next few years UNEP should be 
strengthened, and perhaps the balance of its activities adjusted more to Geneva and 
New York, rather than a new institution of general competence established.”). 
154  See, e.g., Preparatory Commission Resolution, supra note 33, at art. 11; 
Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII(A)(7); UNFCCC, supra 
note 11, at art. 11 (outlining financial mechanisms). 
155  See generally Cluster Munitions CSP, supra note 75 (describing a wide 
variety of funding structures). 
156  See ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(3). 
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CSP will not be in session, this provision primarily governs the 
budget of the Secretariat and any subsidiary bodies. 
 
7. POWERS 
 
Once convened, the CSP will adopt rules of procedure and 
establish financing arrangements.  After that, the CSP will then 
commence its substantive work. 
Originally, CSPs were quite weak and very clearly advisory in 
nature.  Parties to treaties creating international organizations 
generally tend to be relatively comfortable vesting such 
organizations with strong roles.157  In contrast, however, CSPs began 
with largely consultative roles.158  Later, these bodies were 
increasingly permitted to review the operation or implementation 
of the treaty under which they were authorized.159  Incrementally, 
CSPs have received greater and greater powers, including, for 
example, financial authority and the power to create subsidiary 
organs.160  Especially in the field of environmental law, treaty-based 
CSPs, such as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting or human 
rights treaty-based committees, such as the Human Rights 
Committee, have often been tasked with unusually broad powers to 
create new rules, amend treaties, and reach decisions on treaty 
compliance and enforcement.161  Law-making powers can vary from 
the more formalistic approach of adopting new treaty protocols by 
                                                     
157  See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 628–634 (reviewing the types of 
responsibilities organizations to conventions perform). 
158  Id. 
159  For example, the Cf. Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6 was 
amended in 1987 to authorize periodic conferences to regulate the implementation 
of the treaty. See the same article following its amendment in 1987, Amendments to 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, May 28, 1987, 1996 UKTS No. 13 (relevantly 
introducing regular conferences to discuss implementation, make 
recommendations, and ensure that these recommendations were taken into 
consideration). 
160  Cf. Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6(2); CITES, supra note 10, at 
art. XI(3) with ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4) (allowing the CSP to create groups to 
help it in accomplishing its tasks). 
161  See Antarctic Treaty, arts. IX, XII, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 28, 40–42, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. I-XIV., Mar. 
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (detailing the means by which CSP can act in 
accomplishing the tasks given it). 
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active consensus that provide for new or modified obligations, such 
as in the Kyoto Protocol,162 to the more functional approach of 
adopting annexes attached to the underlying treaty163 or 
recommendations for implementing the treaty,164 which bind the 
state parties unless they actively opt-out.165 
Some trends can be identified.  Human rights CSPs tend to be 
able to consider amendments to a treaty that can only be adopted by 
a review conference.166  They also do not usually review parties’ 
compliance with a treaty. Instead, they often delegate that function 
to an expert council or quasi-judicial body that cannot adopt binding 
orders.167   Environmental law CSPs, on the other hand, are usually 
able to aggressively review compliance and adopt amendments.168  
Arms control treaties resemble human rights treaties more in this 
regard and usually do not empower the CSP alone to reach findings 
on treaty compliance and amend a treaty.169  Thus, the parties to the 
ATT may generally view the ATT CSP’s powers as similarly narrow 
                                                     
162  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 20.  See also Ramsar Convention, supra 
note 9, at art. 10 (“[T]his Convention shall enter into force for each Contracting 
party four months after the day   
of its signature without reservation as to ratification, or its deposit of an instrume
nt of ratification or accession.”).  
163  See, e.g., CITES, supra note 10 (listing, for example, endangered species in 
appendices and permitting parties to the CITES to propose amendments to these 
appendices). 
164  See, e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 6(2)(d) (permitting parties 
to, for example, make recommendations regarding aspects of wetland management 
covered by the Convention). 
165  See Sebastian Oberthür, Montreal Protocol: 10 Years After, 27 ENVIRON. POL’Y 
& L. 432, 433 (1997) (requiring states to opt-out of new amendments to the treaty if 
they do not want to be subject to such amendments). 
166  See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (stating the requirement that 
amendments be reviewed before being implemented). 
167  See, e.g., U.N., Human Rights Bodies, available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (citing Human Rights 
Committee, Committee against Torture, Committee on the Rights of the Child as 
treaty-based bodies and putting forth the role and powers of these third party 
entities used to review amendments to the convention). 
168  See, e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 9 (as amended in 1987) (broadly 
granting the CSP amendment powers); London Convention, supra note 15 (as 
amended in 1978) (allowing the CSP to make amendments so as to ensure the ends 
of the convention are met); CITES, supra note 10 (as amended in 1979); Basel 
Convention, supra note 11 (as amended in 1995) (allowing the CSP amendment 
power). 
169  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(16), (17) (permitting 
conferences to be convened as either “Amendment” or “Review” conferences). 
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in this way.  In this light, the United States’ comments, that it did 
not intend to create a body that could enforce the treaty, are 
instructive.170  
 
7.1. Powers of the CSP 
 
 The ATT CSP’s powers are outlined below.  Notably, the ATT 
states that the CSP “shall” undertake its tasks rather than “may” 
undertake them.171  However, there is no specific mechanism for 
review of the CSP’s negligence to discharge its tasks.  Further, 
whether the CSP should be considered an international institution 
with responsibility for violating international law in the discharge 
of its functions for this question is also unclear and is linked back to 
the question of its personality. 
Specifically, the ATT authorizes the CSP to: (a) review the 
implementation of the treaty, including developments in the field of 
conventional arms; (b) consider and adopt recommendations 
regarding the implementation and operation of the treaty, in 
particular the promotion of its universality; (c) consider 
amendments to the treaty in accordance with article 20; (d) consider 
issues arising from the interpretation of the treaty; (e) consider and 
decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat; (f) consider the 
establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to 
improve the functioning of the treaty; and (g) perform any other 
function consistent with the treaty.172  This article will largely follow 
this structure when discussing the powers of the CSP below, with 
minor deviations where necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
170  See USDOS, US Signs ATT, supra note 47 (“There will be no mandate for an 
international body to enforce an ATT.”). 
171  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4) (noting that the CSP “[shall]” carry out 
certain tasks). 
172  Id. at art. 17. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
WORSTER 9/24/2015  4:06 PM 
1028 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:4 
7.1.1. Review implementation of the ATT 
 
First, the ATT CSP shall “[r]eview the implementation of this 
Treaty, including developments in the field of conventional 
arms”.173 
Consulting on how to implement a treaty is a task given to CSPs 
under arms control treaties.174  At least for environmental law CSPs, 
most CSPs have some sort of a complementary monitoring or 
supervisory role in this regard.175  Usually, when undertaking 
review of treaty implementation, States Parties have an obligation 
to exchange information or report on implementation of the 
obligations.176 
                                                     
173  Id. at art. 17(4)(a) (“Review the implementation of this Treaty, including 
developments in the field of conventional arms.”). 
174  See Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8(1) (relevantly 
recording the parties’ agreement to consult regarding implementation of the 
Convention); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(A)(1)(establishing the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Organization to, in part, “ensure the 
implementation of [the Treaty’s] provisions” and “provide a forum for consultation 
and cooperation among State Parties”); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 
17, at art. VIII(B)(20) (“The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this 
Convention.”). 
175  See CITES, supra note 10, at art. XI(3) (noting that parties at the relevant CSP 
shall “review the implementation” of the Convention, including receiving and 
considering reports presented); Bonn Convention, supra note 11, at art. VII(5) 
(similarly requiring the CSP to “review the implementation of this Convention”, 
and, as part of that, to “receive and consider any reports presented”); Basel 
Convention, supra note 11, at art. 15(5) (“[T]he Conference of the Parties shall keep 
under continuous review and evaluation the effective implementation of this 
Convention.”); UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 7(2)(e–g) (noting that the relevant 
CSP “shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention” and 
make “the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention,” including taking into account parties’ implementation and regular 
reports on the Convention); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, at art. 23(4) 
(noting similarly that the relevant CSP shall keep implementation of the 
Convention under review, including by considering and adopting amendments). 
176  See Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note arts. 7, 8 (listing 
transparency measures requiring reporting by parties as well as consultation and 
cooperation regarding implementation and compliance); Inter-American 
Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XX(1)(a), (b) (establishing a 
Consultative Committee responsible for, amongst other things, promoting 
cooperation and exchange of information between parties); Cluster Munitions 
Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6 (listing obligations of cooperation and assistance, 
including “the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and 
scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of the 
Convention.”); Preparatory Commission Resolution, supra note 17, at art. 14, 18, and 
19 (listing the Commission’s responsibilities in ensuring the fulfillment of the 
requirements of the Treaty); UNFCCC, supra note 11, at arts. 11 and 12 (listing 
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For the ATT, each state party has an obligation to report to the 
other States Parties via the Secretariat.177  However, the CSP is not 
expressly empowered to consider those reports under article 17.  
Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the CSP must have an implied 
power to consider such reports in order to discharge its general 
power to review implementation. 
This does not mean, however, that the ATT CSP can necessarily 
review States Parties’ measures for compliance with the treaty.  One 
noticeable omission is that, unlike treaties giving such powers to 
environmental law CSPs, the ATT does not explicitly provide the 
CSP with authority to do this task.  The CSP may only review 
implementation generally,178 without necessarily identifying 
violators.  The question here is whether this power to review 
implementation generally, along with articles 17(4)(b) (adopting 
recommendations), 17(4)(d) (considering interpretation issues), 
17(4)(e) (establishing tasks for the Secretariat), and 17(4)(g) 
(performing any other task), imply the authority for the CSP to 
review specific measures (or omissions) by member states for 
compliance with the ATT.179  Given the fact that other CSPs have 
carried out evaluations of compliance by member states, the ATT 
CSP could take this more aggressive approach.  Certainly, one of the 
advantages of having an independent treaty body is the creation of 
a forum for assessing treaty compliance rather than having to 
depend on individual states invoking the treaty in their bilateral 
relations.  Given the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms, a 
“name-and-shame” process would appear to be the most powerful 
tool for inducing compliance.  That tool would be undercut if the 
CSP would not review measures taken by specific states.  Although 
this more vigorous approach might make sense, the CSP must 
expressly decide to exercise this power, and provide related funding 
if necessary. 
If indeed the CSP interprets its authority under article 17(4)(a) to 
provide for substantive evaluation of state compliance with the ATT 
                                                     
obligations to establish a mechanism to provide financial resources and to exchange 
information relevant to the Convention). 
177  See ATT, supra note 1, at arts. 11(6), (13) (encouraging and requiring 
reporting by state parties to report on measures taken and details of relevant 
imports and exports). 
178  See id. at art. 17(4)(a) (“The Conference of States Parties shall . . . [r]eview 
the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of 
conventional arms.”). 
179  See generally ATT, supra note 1, art. 17(b), (d), (e), (g). 
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then presumably it will do so by applying the normal interpretive 
technique of the law of treaties, along with the default rules on state 
responsibility.180  Another question is whether the CSP would then 
take on a quasi-judicial character, and, in turn, whether it would 
receive, inter alia, state complaints, third party complaints, and 
amicus curiae submissions, and whether it would need to adopt rules 
of procedure that provide for fair hearing and rights of participation.  
Presumably, the CSP will not take on this character. 
To get a better sense of the expected powers of the ATT, we can 
look at the views of the States Parties.  During the negotiation of the 
ATT, several states submitted on the importance of review or follow 
up mechanisms in the treaty. 181  Many agreed that there should be 
                                                     
180  See VCLT, supra note 61, at arts. 31-32 (establishing the rules to be used in 
interpretations); Int’l L. Comm’n, James Crawford, Spec. Rapp., Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 
¶ 76 (2001) (providing text on the responsibility of the states for international 
wrongful acts). 
181  See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 10, 2012, supra note 29 
(response of Algeria, paras. VI(6),5, Mar. 29, 2012) (“[R]egular review of the treaty 
would make it possible to evaluate its effectiveness and to modify it as needed.”); 
id. (response of Bulgaria, para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (“We consider appropriate the 
establishment of a review mechanism. Conferences to review the status, 
implementation and scope of the treaty should be conducted at mutually agreed 
interval.”); id. (response of Costa Rica, para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (supporting “the 
establishment of an assembly of States Parties and a five-yearly review 
conference.”); id. (response of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para. 
VII. 10 April 2012) (noting that it “supports the proposal on annual meetings of 
States Parties to promote dialogue and ensure smooth functioning of the treaty, as 
well as the holding of review conferences every five years following its entry into 
force”); id. (response of Kenya, para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (supporting “the 
establishment of an assembly of States Parties and a review conference to be held 
every five years”); id. (response of Mauritania (on behalf of the League of Arab 
States), para. 7, Mar. 30, 2012) (supporting a “consensus”-based five-year review 
process); id. (response of Poland, para. VII, Apr. 4, 2012) (“It is advisable that the 
treaty foresee a review mechanism such as review conferences every five years after 
entry into force to ensure appropriate  implementation.”); id. (response of Senegal, 
para. 15, Apr. 27, 2007) (supporting five-year review conferences); U.N. Secretariat, 
Compilations of views, May 10, 2012, supra note 38 (response of Switzerland, para. 
VIII, 3 April 2012) (“Switzerland supports the establishment of an assembly of 
States Parties and a quinannual review conference.”); id. (response of Trinidad and 
Tobago (on behalf of the Caribbean Community), Mar. 31, 2012) (“CARICOM 
supports the principles as set out in the Chair’s non-paper, in particular the 
references to the Charter of the United Nations.”); id. (response of the U.K., Mar. 30, 
2012) (“The United Kingdom fully supports the preamble as set out in the Chair’s 
non-paper and in particular its strong humanitarian focus.”); id. (response of 
Zambia, Apr. 18, 2012) (supporting “the convening of a review conference every 
five years to provide an opportunity for States Parties to review the implementation 
of the treaty and consider proposed amendments to the instrument”); id. (response 
of the U.K., para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (recording that the U.K. “fully supports . . . 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/4
WORSTER 9/24/2015  4:06 PM 
2015] ARMS TRADE TREATY REGIME 1031 
a meeting, at least once per five years, for substantive review of the 
treaty, potentially including discussion on amendment of the treaty 
text.182  This review conference mechanism is quite the norm for 
arms control treaties.183 
However, support for the creation of a meeting of the parties for 
review was often contrasted with support for an intercessional 
meeting, probably annually, that would specifically only have the 
power to review implementation of the treaty generally.184  For 
example, Bulgaria suggested that the intersessional meeting would 
merely “enhance implementation, promote the universality of the 
treaty and request or provide assistance.”185  The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) submitted that the meetings of the 
States Parties should be annual but that the role of these meetings 
should be to “promote dialogue and ensure smooth functioning of 
the treaty”.186  Poland argued that the intersessional conference 
should serve as a “forum of consultations and preparatory work.”187  
Switzerland viewed the review function as involving the review of 
the treaty instrument and acting as an “information broker”, i.e. it 
                                                     
the establishment of an assembly of States Parties and a five-yearly review 
conference”); id. (response of Zambia, para. VIII, Apr. 18, 2012)(“Zambia submits 
that the treaty should include the establishment of an assembly of States Parties and 
a five-yearly review conference.”); UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, 2007, supra 
note 6, at pt. II (response of Argentina, para. 27, July 2, 2007) (supporting the 
possibility of “periodic review”  to enable updates and adaptations to the 
instrument); id. (response of Bulgaria, June 1, 2011) ( supporting “launching a 
United Nations-based process aimed at achieving an agreed regulatory framework 
for arms transfers (an arms trade treaty).”); id. (response of Hungary, para. 23, May 
8, 2007) (proposing various options for regular review processes). 
182  See supra note 181.  
183
 See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 12; 
(requiring review conferences every five years); Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra 
note 7, at art. VIII(3) (setting out requirements relating to review conferences); Final 
Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Doc. BWC/CONF.III/23, part II. at arts. 
XI and XII. [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention] (allowing parties to 
propose amendments and setting out a mechanism for regular review conferences). 
184  See infra notes 127–31. 
185  U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 10, 2012, supra note 29 (response 
of Bulgaria, para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (suggesting during intersessional periods, 
“State parties meet annually or biannually to enhance implementation, promote the 
universality of the treaty and request or provide assistance.”). 
186  U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 10, 2012, supra note 29 (response 
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para. VII, Apr. 10, 2012). 
187  Id. (response of Poland, Apr. 4, 2012). 
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would “collate and analyze the information provided and, if 
needed, to bring the information into a comparable form.”188  
Ukraine believed that the periodic conferences would “ensure, inter 
alia, the harmonious interpretation and implementation of the 
treaty.”189  In addition, Kenya submitted that the treaty needed a 
dispute settlement mechanism, but it did so only in reference to the 
obligation to resolve disputes peacefully under article 2(3) of the 
U.N. Charter.190 
On the basis of the comments from states, the Chair produced a 
“non-paper” suggesting that there be an “Assembly of States 
Parties” (later “CSP”) that met periodically and that this meeting 
would be distinct from the “Review Conference” at which 
amendments would be decided.191  Thus, the negotiating history 
suggests that a distinction should be made between the five-year 
meetings, which have significant powers of review and later 
evolved into the Review Conference, and the intercessional meeting 
that merely engaged in dialogue and prepared for the Review 
Conference, which evolved into the CSP. 
Furthermore, many states that are issuing views on the ATT took 
the position that the CSP should be relatively weak in terms of its 
powers to review implementation.  Cuba viewed the only necessary 
organ of this type as being an “implementation support unit” that 
would essentially perform only the roles of the Secretariat, and 
which “should not take on reporting, inspection, review, assessment 
or representative duties.”192  Some states suggested that the CSP 
                                                     
188  UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, supra note 50 (response of Switzerland) 
(suggesting “a minimal structure should be set up within the United Nations to 
collate and analyse [sic] the information provided and, if needed, to bring the 
information into a comparable form. This unit could also act as an “information 
broker” on request of Member States.”). 
189  U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of Views, May 10, 2012, supra note 29 (response 
of Ukraine, para. VI, Mar. 27, 2012). 
190  Id. (response of Kenya, para. VIII, Mar. 30, 2012) (supporting the “provision 
that States Parties consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or interpretation of the treaty” and 
suggesting “that parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of the treaty by peaceful means in accordance with . . 
. the Charter of the United Nations”). 
191  See Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. For the U.N. Conference on the Arms 
Trade Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/1 (Mar. 7, 2012), Ann. II, Chair’s non-paper, 
para. VII, §§ F–H (July 14, 2011) (recommending powers of amendment, and to 
establish an assembly of state parties and review conferences). 
192  U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 14, 2012, supra note 29 (response 
of Cuba, paras. VI and VIII, Mar. 30, 2012). 
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should share best practices or be a forum for consultations and/or 
cooperation.193  Japan, singularly, proposed that the CSP should 
only review the management and listing of weapons that were 
controlled.194 
Other states envisioned a more rigorous peer-review system of 
treaty implementation.195  Ukraine offered the bold suggestion that 
parties should submit reports on treaty implementation to a regular 
assembly meeting that would ensure implementation and assist 
with “making necessary conclusions” regarding implementation.196  
Algeria went so far as to propose a “supranational monitoring or 
verification body” and “the use of non-State sources of information 
as a basis for action against a State”.197  These views on stronger 
enforcement mechanisms were clearly in the minority, although 
some states remained very vague in their proposals.198  
The negotiating positions are certainly not definitive 
representations of the final operating powers of the CSP.  In the final 
draft of the ATT, clearly it appears that the parties wanted to 
distinguish between “big picture” powers of treaty amendment and 
                                                     
193  See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 14, 2012, supra note 29 
(response of New Zealand, para. VI, Mar. 30, 2012) (recommending that the annual 
meetings simply be a place to “to follow up on the information contained in reports 
on arms transfers and to engage on their experiences with treaty implementation” 
in a spirit of “peer engagement” to assist with capacity-building”); id. (response of 
Poland, para. VII, Apr. 4, 2012) (noting that implementation may be facilitated 
through “the exchange of best practices”); UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, 2007, 
supra note 6 (response of Hungary, para. 23, May 8, 2007) (“Another separate or 
parallel option might be to establish a separate organization entrusted with 
ensuring the implementation of relevant arms trade treaty provisions and 
providing furthermore a forum for consultations and cooperation among States 
Parties.”). 
194  See UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, 2007, supra note 6 (response of 
Japan, para. 8, Apr. 30, 2007) (stating that the convention believes that the treaty 
should include a complete system of control over the transfer of all conventional 
arms). 
195  See, e.g., id. (response of France, para. 34 (a), Apr. 23, 2007) (noting, 
interestingly, that France suggested either “a guide of best practices or a peer-
review on control mechanisms”); id. (response of Lithuania, para. 10, Apr. 24, 2007) 
(suggesting the treaty should aim at “[e]stablishing operative provisions to monitor 
enforcement of the future arms trade treaty and review procedures to strengthen 
the full implementation of its provisions”). 
196  U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of views, May 14, 2012, supra note 29 (response 
of Ukraine, para. VIII, Mar. 27, 2012). 
197  Id. at response of Algeria, para. VI(5) (Mar. 29, 2012). 
198  See, e.g., UNGA, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, 2007, supra note 6 (response 
of Italy, para. 13, May 10, 2007) (stating that “a review mechanism should be 
envisaged”). 
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consideration of the treaty as an effective instrument in international 
relations by the Review Conference, from the on-going assessment 
of implementation and cooperation issues by the CSP.  Looking at 
the various legal bases justifying action, there does appear to be 
room for the CSP to review individual cases of compliance and 
consult on resolution, perhaps even reaching findings on non-
compliance.  This power, however, will be based on the power to 
review implementation taken with the other powers in the ATT.  
This topic will be addressed in the sections that follow. 
 
7.1.2. Consider recommendations 
 
Secondly, the ATT CSP shall “[c]onsider and adopt 
recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of 
this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality.”199 
Some CSPs are authorized to require exchange of expertise 
and/or training and/or financing,200 or require assistance in arms 
reduction and/or destruction.201  Other treaties that contain CSPs 
require resort to normal dispute settlement mechanisms outside of 
the CSP in the case of state-to-state disputes.202 
Other treaties permit the CSP to have its own independent role 
in reaching findings on non-compliance.203  In some treaties, parties 
                                                     
199  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4)(b). 
200  See Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XX(1)(c), 
(d) (providing for States Parties to “establish a Consultative Committee responsible 
for c) encouraging cooperation between national liaison authorities to detect 
suspected illicit exports and imports of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other 
related materials; d) promoting training and exchange of knowledge and 
experience among States Parties and technical assistance between States Parties and 
relevant international organizations, as well as academic studies;”); Cluster 
Munitions Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6 (outlining ways in which States Parties 
can provide assistance to each other). 
201  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6(4–5) 
(outlining States Parities commitment to aiding other States Parties in the clearance 
and destruction of anti-personnel mines); Cluster Munitions Convention, supra note 
7, at art. 6(4–5) (detailing the assistance States Parties can provide to one another in 
the reduction or destruction of arms). 
202  See generally CITES, supra note 10, at art. XVIII(2); Bonn Convention, supra 
note 11, art. XIII; Basel Convention, supra note 11, art. 20; Vienna Ozone 
Convention, supra note 11, art. 11(3), (4); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, art. 
27; UNFCCC, supra note 11, art. 14(1–2). 
203  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 8 (finding that “The Parties . . . 
shall consider and approve procedures and institutional mechanisms for 
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may even inquire into each other’s compliance and even refer 
matters for investigation,204 or decide on “measures” to take in 
response to non-compliance205 but this latter practice remains 
unusual.  In at least in one case, an arms control treaty permits 
inquiry into non-party practices.206 
If there is a finding of non-compliance, other treaties are more 
explicit than the ATT in providing a list of possible remedies,207 or 
permitting remedies but leaving the scope open.208 
Building on the prior section on review, the power of the ATT to 
substantively review individual state’s compliance was not clear; it 
is also unclear whether the ATT CSP can attempt to compel 
                                                     
determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol and for treatment 
of Parties found to be in non-compliance.”); UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 14(1) 
(“In the event of a dispute between any tow or more Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a 
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their 
own choice.”); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 18.; Desertification Convention, 
supra note 11, at art. 27 (“The Conference of the Parties shall consider and adopt 
procedures and institutional mechanisms for the resolution of questions that may 
arise with regard to the implementation of the Convention.”). 
204  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 8(2), 8(5), 
10(1) (giving procedures for ensuring states compliance); Cluster Munitions 
Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8(3), (6) (permitting the parties to look into one 
another’s compliance with the convention); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at arts. 
II(A)(1), (B)(24), (25), (26)(g) (empowering the conference to oversee compliance 
with the convention); Preparatory Commission Resolution, supra note 17, at arts. 13 
(permitting the commission to make all preparations needed to guarantee the 
operationalization of the treaty’s enforcement regime). 
205  See, e.g., id., at art. 8(18), (19); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. II(B)(24), 
(25), (26)(g) (discussing the process for handling non-compliance of states). 
206  See Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XX(1)(e) 
(“In order to attain the objectives of this Convention, the States Parties shall 
establish a Consultative Committee responsible for . . . requesting from nonparty 
states, when appropriate, information on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking 
in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials . . . ”). 
207  See, e.g., Climate Change Conference of the Parties Dec. 10/CP.4, ann., 
paras. 6, 12 (1998) (specifically, “clarifying and resolving questions; providing 
advice and recommendations on the procurement of technical and financial 
resources for the resolution of these difficulties; providing advice on the 
compilation and communication of information.”); Montreal Protocol, Moving of 
the Parties Dec. IV/5 (referencing the “list of measures that might be taken in 
respect of non-compliance.”).  
208  See Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Exec. Body Dec. 1997/2, ann., 
para. 11, Jan 7, 1998 (reporting on the fifteenth session of the Executive Body of 
LTRAP).  
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compliance.209  The ATT does give one example of a 
recommendation that the CSP could consider, specifically, that the 
CSP can consider how to promote the universality of the treaty.210 
Some authorities, such as the UNODA, have advocated for a strong 
universalization policy to promote the ATT as a normative treaty,211 
and this may come to be.  However, it shows that the kind of 
recommendations that the States Parties envisioned were not along 
the lines of a vigorous non-compliance procedure, but rather a more 
mild promotional approach.  The ATT CSP does not appear to enjoy 
the same degree of authority to adopt rules as CSPs under other 
conventions.212  Some authorities have suggested that the power to 
review reports and issue findings on compliance is inherent in the 
power to consider reports.213  One possibility is that the CSP might 
issue a “recommendation” that takes the form of a proposed 
amendment or protocol, which States Parties were then invited to 
ratify.214  
 
7.1.3. Interpretation of the ATT 
 
Thirdly, the ATT CSP shall “[c]onsider issues arising from the 
interpretation of this Treaty.”215 
                                                     
209  See also ATT, supra note 1, at art. 14 (stating that, “[e]ach State Party shall 
take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement 
the provisions of this Treaty.”).  
210  See id. at art. 17(4) (b) (recommending the CSP to strategically push for 
international implementation of its treaty).  
211  See UNODA, Kane, Presentation, supra note 64 (describing UNODA’s 
stronger advocacy for universalization treatment of ATT).  
212  See Basel Convention Conference of the Parties Dec. II/12 (1994), available 
at http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/meetings/cop/ 
cop1-4/cop2dece.pdf; Montreal Protocol Moving of the Parties Dec. II/8, Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (providing rule adopting authority).  
213  See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at §§ 446, 1402–5 (examining the 
source of authority to review reports and comment on compliance issues). 
214  See, e.g., P.H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B. 
C. ENVTL.  AFF. L. REV., 213–14, 18 (1991) (reviewing various recommendations that 
have been presented to become ratified and discussing the need for international 
ratification of recommendations). 
215  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4)(d). 
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Other CSPs engage in interpretation, usually implicitly,216 
though sometimes explicitly.217  This power should be distinguished 
from the practice of adopting subsequent agreements as a method 
of codifying treaty interpretations.218 
In the case of the ATT, the CSP may “consider issues arising 
from the interpretation,”219 but it is not clear whether the CSP may 
issue interpretations of the ATT or simply consult on the 
interpretation.  That being said, it will probably need to interpret the 
ATT in the course of evaluating the implementation in connection 
with its other duties. 
It might be helpful to also take note of ATT article 19(1) 
providing for peaceful settlement of disputes over the 
“interpretation” of the ATT, which could take place outside of the 
CSP.220  Since the ATT expressly permits disputes over 
interpretation to be settled through “negotiations, mediation, 
conciliation, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means,” it is not 
clear what is the role and legal effect of the CSP’s interpretations.221  
Since the ATT states that the role of the CSP is to “consider issues 
arising from the interpretation of this Treaty,” it does not appear to 
provide for definitive interpretation. 
There does not appear to be any special procedure required for 
interpretations of the ATT, though the CSP might adopt special 
procedures in those cases. 
                                                     
216  See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, Conference of Parties to the Convention, Res. CITES.CONF.9.24 
(Nov. 1994) (listing “criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II"); Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Conference 
of Parties to Convention, Res. CITES.CONF.4.27 (Apr. 1983) (providing an 
“interpretation of Article XVII, paragraph 3, of the Convention” as a demonstration 
of the implicit interpretation role). 
217  See WTO Agreement, supra note 14, at art. IX:2 (“the Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations 
of this Agreement  and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”). 
218  Having the power to adopt interpretations does not generally exclude 
recourse to subsequent agreement or practice as an interpretive technique.  See EC 
Chicken Cuts, Appl. Body Rep., WTO Case Nos. WT/DS269/AB/R, 
WT/DS286/AB/R, para. 273 WTO Appl. Body (Sep. 12, 2005) (finding no lex 
specialis relationship between article IX:2 and VCLT art. 31(3)). For a more detailed 
discussion on the legal effects of acts of interpretation, specifically as “subsequent 
agreements” or “subsequent practice” under the VCLT, see notes 61–63 and 
accompanying text. 
219  ATT, supra note 1, at art 19(1). 
220  Id. 
221  Id. 
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7.1.4. Consider amendments 
 
The ATT CSP shall “[c]onsider amendments to this Treaty in 
accordance with Article 20.”222 
States have always had the power to propose amendments to 
treaties, even without a CSP structure,223 so the ability to consider 
amendments is not new, but vesting specific power in the CSP is 
part of the emerging international institutional practice regarding 
CSPs. Initially in drafting the ATT, the language “in accordance with 
[Article 20]” did not appear.224  This limitation was added later 
presumably to ensure that the CSP does not have independent 
authority to amend the ATT without the protections in Article 20.  
This addition, along with the power being described as merely to 
“consider” amendments, leads us to conclude that the CSP is 
essentially a forum for discussing the need for amendments.225  This 
conclusion accords with the interpretation applied in other CSPs.226 
For the ATT, the lack of power to amend distinguishes it from 
many of the environmental law treaties where the CSPs are often 
much more powerful.227  Some CSPs have the power, perhaps as an 
                                                     
222  Id. at art. 17(4)(c). 
223  See, e.g., Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, supra note 7, at art. 
8(1) (“At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting 
Pay propose amendments to this Convention or any annexed Protocol by which it 
is bound.”).  
224  U.N. Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, President’s Non-Paper, 
20 March 2013, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ 
Presidents_Non_Paper_of_20%20March_2013_%28ATT_Final_Conference%29.pd
f. 
225  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 17(4)(c).  
226  See, e.g., Cluster Munitions Convention, supra note 7, art. 11(1), 12 
(discussing the power of the States Parties to meet, review, and make decisions 
about the “implementation of this Convention”); Chemical Weapons Convention, 
art. VIII(B)(12) (allowing for sessions to be called to review the implementation of 
the Convention).  But see also, Weapons Convention, supra note 22, art. XII (granting 
the CSP the power to call for a Review Conference to consider amendments). 
227  See, e.g., London Convention, supra note 15 (detailing the power of the 
Contracting Parties to make amendments to the convention with a two-third 
majority vote) (Protocol adopted in 1978); CITES, supra note 10, at art. XVII (Protocol 
adopted in 1979) (stating that one third of the Parties will be sufficient for a meeting 
to be called where amendments can be considered, with two-thirds being sufficient 
for the amendments to be adopted); Bonn Convention, supra note 11, at art. X 
(stating that the Convention can be amended at any given meeting subject to a few 
regulations); Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 11, at art. 6(4) (allowing for new 
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alternative to amendment, to adopt protocols to the treaty.228  For 
regional treaties, it is more common to provide for adoption of 
protocols through diplomatic conferences rather than through the 
CSP, which is understandable given the smaller number of 
parties.229  These are not true legislative powers and any amendment 
or protocol must be ratified by the various states.230  
Where some CSPs can adopt changes without the need for 
subsequent ratification is in annexes to treaties.  Some treaties 
contain annexes that provide greater elaboration of the treaty’s 
coverage, and in most cases, these annexes may be amended by the 
CSP without the need for state ratification.231  Usually, the changes 
in the annex are adopted by majority vote without the possibility for 
dissenting members to avoid the new obligation by objection.  While 
often merely fine-tuning the list of particular objects coverage, the 
changes to annexes can be significant.232  Other arms control CSPs 
                                                     
protocols which would promote the purpose of the Convention to be adopted); 
Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 11(4)(h) (stating that at meetings thee Parties 
will “[c]onsider and adopt, as required, proposals for amendment of this Protocol 
or any annex and for any new annex”); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, at 
art. 23(4)(d) (stating that the Parties can review and amend the Convention); 
Desertification Convention, supra note 11, at art. 22(2)(f) (establishing that Parties 
can make amendments). 
228  See, e.g., Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 11, at art. 8. See also Montreal 
Protocol, supra note 11, adopted by the CSP allowing for the adoption of 
protocols)(allowing the adoption of protocols in accordance with Article 2); Basel 
Convention, supra note 11, at art. 15(5)(d) (stating that the Parties are able to adopt 
protocols); Protocol on Liability and Compensation adopted by the CSP); UNFCCC, 
supra note 11, at art. 17 (allowing for protocols to be adopted at any session; Kyoto 
Protocol, supra note 11, adopted by the CSP also allowing for the adoption of 
protocols); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 11, at art. 23(4)(c) (allowing for the 
adoption of protocols). 
229  See, e.g., UNEP Regional Seas Strategic Conventions 2013–2016 (Sept 29, 
2014); Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (illustrating the dominance of using protocols to adopt international 
treaties). 
230  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 13(2) (discussing the difficulties of 
legislating international bodies).  
231  Montreal Protocol, supra note 11; Bonn Convention, supra note 11; Basel 
Convention, supra note 11; CITES, supra note 10; London Convention, supra note 15. 
232  See, e.g., 1979 UKTS No. 71; Res. LDC.50(16) (1993), 1995 UKTS No. 90 
(wherein the CSP amended its annex and provided for regulations on waste 
incineration at sea); London Consultative Meeting of the Parties Res. LDC.49(16), 
51(16) (1993), 1995 UKTS Nos. 89, 91; Montreal Protocol MOP Dec. II/1, Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro2/3 (adjusting the production and consumption of the controlled 
substances listed in Annex A to the Protocol); Montreal Protocol MOP Decs. IV/2, 
IV/3, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, p13 at Decisions IV/2 and IV/3 (1992), available 
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can also have this power to update a list of scheduled items,233 
though it is unusual. 
That being said, we have already observed that the CSP has the 
authority to consider interpretation of the ATT234 and perform other 
tasks not inconsistent with the ATT.235  These provisions, along with 
the usual presumption of intra vires, mean that the CSP might be able 
to asset a stronger role in the amendment process than initially 
appreciated.  Even if it cannot amend the ATT outside of article 20, 
it can interpret the meaning of the terms as they already exist in the 
treaty.  It is a fine line, sometimes, between aggressive interpretation 
and full amendment.  For example, the ATT does not contain an 
annex of monitored items like other treaties in this study.  Instead, 
the covered weapons are included in the treaty text at article 2.236  
Unless the CSP later adopts an annex system, changes to the covered 
weapons will require a treaty amendment.  It is likely that adopting 
an annex system would require an amendment itself. 
However, since the CSP reserves the right to consider 
interpretations of the treaty, it could interpret the definitions of 
listed weapons with reference to expert information as a de facto, 
albeit limited, modification process.  For example, article 2(1)(a) of 
the ATT covers “battle tanks.”  In turn, the list of weapons covered 
under that heading resembles the list maintained by the U.N. 
Register of Conventional Arms (“UNROCA”) 237  and thus suggests 
that “battle tanks” should be interpreted in align with the UNROCA 
understanding. Thus, the interpretation of the UNROCA (perhaps 
by the UNODA) might already modify the understanding of the 
items covered under article 2(1)(a).  In the alternative, the CSP might 
consider an interpretation that looks to the recent technological 
developments in the field of battle tanks to modify its 
understanding of “battle tanks” and render a recommendation to 
                                                     
at http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/committee_documents.php?committee_ 
id=1 (noting the entry into force of Annex D to the Protocol on May 27, 1992);. 
233  See Test-Ban Treaty, art. II(B)(24), (25), (26) (describing the powers and 
functions of the conference). 
234  See ATT art. 17(4)(d) (“The Conference of States Parties shall [c]onsider 
issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty.”). 
235  See id. at art. 17(4)(g) (“The Conference of States Parties shall [p]erform any 
other function consistent with this Treaty.”). 
236  Id. at art. 2. 
237  UNGA, United Nations Register of Convention Arms, Report of the 
Secretary-General, Add., UN Doc. A/69/124/Add.1 (Sep. 9, 2014). 
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that effect.  This process would have an effect similar to changes in 
covered weapons in an annex. 
 
7.1.5. Manage the Secretariat 
 
The ATT CSP shall “[c]onsider and decide the tasks and budget 
of the Secretariat.” 238 
Control over the Secretariat by the CSP is common in other 
CSPs.239  In other CSPs, the organ may have a more detailed 
oversight of the extensive work of the Secretariat.240  However, for 
the ATT, not only can the CSP determine the finances of the organ, 
but also require the Secretariat to undertake certain tasks.  It is not 
entirely clear how far this control goes.  It could be that the CSP 
grants general authority to the Secretariat for operations or provides 
a specific listing of tasks and authorized expenditure.  If the CSP 
adopts the normal practice of international organizations, it will 
reserve considerable discretion to the Secretariat to determine 
specific expenditure.  Thus, the CSP does not have any explicit 
authority, other than financial authority, over the personnel policies 
of the Secretariat, though the CSP might attempt to assert control 
either through conditioning certain budget items or claiming 
implied general control over the operations of the Secretariat under 
articles 17(4)(a) (reviewing the implementation of the treaty to the 
degree that the Secretariat implements the treaty), 17(4)(d) 
(considering interpretation of the treaty to the degree that the CSP 
can interpret its own powers) or 17(4)(g) (performing any other 
function consistent with the treaty to the degree that the treaty does 
not forbid such oversight). 
 
                                                     
238  See ATT, art. 17(4)(e) (The Conference of the States Parties shall [c]onsider 
and decide tasks and budget of the Secretariat.”). 
239  See Preparatory Commission Resolution, art. 10 (listing the tasks 
“concerning the organization and work of the Technical Secretariat and requiring 
immediate attention” after the treaty enters into force); Test-Ban Treaty, art. 
II(B)(24), (25), (26) (describing the powers and functions of the Conference); 
Chemical Weapons Convention, art. VIII(B)(20) (describing the powers and 
functions of the Conference, including overseeing the activities of the Executive 
Council and reviewing compliance, among others). 
240  See e.g., Preparatory Commission Resolution, art. 12 (listing the draft 
arrangements, arrangements and guidelines the Commission will develop). 
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7.1.6. Subsidiary Bodies 
 
When performing its tasks, the CSP may ask for assistance not 
only from the Secretariat.  It can also establish subsidiary bodies.241 
For other CSPs, the power to create subsidiary bodies is often 
implied,242 but for the ATT CSP, it is express.243  This decision to 
include express terms on point suggests two possible 
considerations: either the parties to the ATT understood 
international institutional law to apply and, thus, the CSP would 
naturally have the power to establish subsidiary bodies, or the 
parties to the ATT understood that the CSP would not be governed 
by international institutional law, thus, needing the express 
authority to create subsidiary bodies. 
The CSP has the power to establish subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary to improve the functioning of the ATT.244  Contrasted with 
the Secretariat, which is an organ created by the treaty itself, 
subsidiary bodies can be organs operating at the pleasure of the 
CSP.245  While the CSP may only create subsidiary bodies where 
“necessary to improve the functioning of” the ATT, the CSP most 
likely enjoys a presumption that its interpretation of the best 
functioning of the ATT is correct, especially given its interpretative 
authority in article 17(4)(d).  Thus, if the CSP determines that the 
creation of a subsidiary body is necessary, this interpretation will 
likely control.  In addition, the use of the term “necessary” suggests 
the doctrine of “functional necessity” in international institutional 
law might be applicable.246 
Under general principles of international institutional law, a 
subsidiary body can only exercise those powers enjoyed by the 
parent organ and delegated to the subsidiary, but that does not 
                                                     
241   See ATT, art. 17(4)(f) (“The Conference of the States Parties shall [c]onsider 
the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the 
functioning of this Treaty.”). 
242  For a description of the powers and functions of the conferences, see Test-
Ban Treaty, art. II(B)(24), (25), (26); CITES, supra note 10, at art. XI(3)(e)  
243   Id. 
244  See supra note 177. 
245   See supra note 177. 
246   JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 32–
35  (2d ed. 2009).  
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mean that the subsidiary will not receive significant powers.247  For 
example, subsidiary bodies can receive a delegation of power to 
review non-compliance activities in accordance with the treaty.248  
Types of subsidiary organs generally can be divided into several 
functional categories: (1) expert advice;249 (2) financial and assistance 
arrangements;250 and (3) implementation and/or compliance.251  For 
the ATT, possible subsidiary committees could be a monitoring 
committee or a sanctions recommendation committee, separating 
these contentious political issues from the state representatives. 
Membership on these committees can be the same as the States 
Parties or can be independent experts.252 
 
7.1.7. Any Other Function 
 
Lastly, the ATT CSP may “[p]erform any other function 
consistent with this Treaty.”253  This provision functions as an open-
ended catchall authorization, intend to ensure the effective 
operation of the CSP within the bounds of the ATT. 
                                                     
247   See e.g., 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-8] ECR 133 (addressing the 
delegation of powers by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community).  
248   Montreal Protocol MOP Dec. II/5, Montreal Protocol MOP Dec. IV/5, Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro4/15. 
249  See, e.g., Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice of the 
UNFCCC; Scientific Council of the Bonn Convention, available at 
https://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/international_unfccc.php#c . 
250  See, e.g., Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, available at http://www. 
unmfs.org/POLICYdoc/Policy60.pdf; UNFCCC, art. 1.1 (noting that the purpose 
of the agreement is to provide financial assistance); Global Environment Facility 
available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef. 
251  See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 8 (discussing the creation 
and institutionalization of mechanisms for determining non-compliance); 
Implementation Committee; LRTAP Convention, art. 7, 1994 Sulphur Protocol, 
Implementation Committee; UNFCCC, art. 10 (establishing a subsidiary body for 
implementation). 
252  See, e.g., Montreal Protocol MOP Dec. II/5, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990) 
as amended by Dec. III/20, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11 (1991) (requiring that the 
Implementation Committee include ten members elected by the CSP, following 
“equitable geographical distribution”); Bonn Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII(2), 
Scientific Council (shall include “qualified experts”). 
253  See ATT art. 17(4)(g) (“The Conference of States Parties shall [p]erform any 
other function consistent with this Treaty.”). 
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Here, as well, this kind of provision is common for other CSPs, 
which permit them to consider other matters falling within the 
treaty.254 
Notwithstanding this catchall, it can safely be understood that 
the CSP cannot set aside such core provisions with regard to the 
terms of its own creation or limitations on its competence.255 
 
7.1.8. Entering into international agreements 
 
One thing that is not included in the ATT is the CSP’s ability to 
enter into international agreements with other international legal 
persons.  While the question remains open whether the CSP is an 
international organization, one issue is the ability of the treaty 
bodies to enter into agreements.  This concern will become more 
pressing if the CSP, and even more importantly, the Secretariat, 
create a permanent headquarters in a host state.  The issues of 
privileges and immunities will be addressed separately below. 
The first question is whether the CSP would have such 
authority.  Certainly, those CSPs that are part of a true international 
                                                     
254  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, art. 11 (describing 
the meetings of the states’ parties); Inter-American Trafficking Convention, art. 
XX(1)(f) (noting the establishment of a Consultation Committee to “promoting 
measures to facilitate the application of this Convention”); Test-Ban Treaty, art. 
II(B)(24), (25), (26) (describing the powers and functions of the conference); 
Chemical Weapons Convention, art. VIII(B)(19) (describing the powers and 
functions of the conference); London Convention, supra note 15, at art. XIV(4)(f) 
(“Consultative or special meetings of the Contracting Parties shall keep under 
continuing review the implementation of this Convention and may, inter alia: 
consider any additional action that may be required.”); LRTAP Convention, art. 
10(2)(c); UNFCCC, art. 7(2)(m) (“The Conference of the Parties … shall … [e]xercise 
such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the 
Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under the Convention.”); 
CITES, supra note 10, art. XI(3) (noting the power of the parties to review the 
implementation of the convention); Kyoto Protocol, art. 13; (discussing the rules of 
procedure and implementation for the Conference of the Parties); Ramsar 
Convention, supra note 9, art. 6 (approving Strategic Framework and guidelines). 
255  See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at § 915 (discussing the 
relationships between the U.N. and the member states); 15 U.N. JURID. YB 200–01 
(1976) (noting cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of 
African Unity); id. at 164–65 (1981) (discussing action of the General Assembly on 
the Namibia question). 
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organization can enter into treaties via their host organizations.256  
Most CSPs have not entered into binding international 
agreements,257 but instead relied on parallel decisions by the CSP 
and the other party providing for certain rights and obligations.258  
Even though agreements have not been widespread, MOUs 
between CSPs and other international persons can be an 
alternative.259 
While admittedly it has not entered into force, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International 
Organizations or Between International Organizations states that 
the capacity of an international organization to conclude agreements 
is governed by the “rules of the organization.”260  The ATT contains 
no provision permitting the CSP to enter into international 
agreements, though the implied powers doctrine261 might permit it 
where it is necessary for the functions of the ATT.  Some 
international organizations were not expressly granted authority to 
enter into international agreements, yet they have been using the 
                                                     
256  See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 
25 ILM 543 (1986) [hereinafter VCLTIO]. 
257  But see Agreement between the Government of Canada and the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1987 Montreal Protocol regulating 
matters resulting from the establishment in Canada of the Multilateral Fund and its 
Organs, Nov. 23, 1998, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/25/68, Decision 25/75, para. 107 
(concluding an agreement regulating matters resulting from the establishment in 
Canada of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol and its organs); Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the 
Convention Secretariat, U.N.—FRG—Secretariat of U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, June 20, 1996, FCCC/CP/1996/MISC.1 (documenting an 
agreement among the United Nations, the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change). 
258  See, e.g., Climate Change COP Dec. 14/CP.1, art. 2, Jun. 6, 1995 (deciding 
that “the Convention secretariat shall be institutionally linked to the United 
Nations”); UNGA Res. 50/115,U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1, p. 
174,U.N. Doc. A/50/49 (1995), available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ 
ga/res/50/ares50-115.htm (“[e]ndorse[d] the institutional linkage between the 
Convention secretariat and the United Nations, as advised by the Secretary-General 
and adopted by the Conference of the Parties.”).  
259  See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Council of the Global Environment Facility, Dec. 12/CP.2, annex, U.N. Doc. FCCC/ 
CP/1996/15/Add.1 (Oct. 26, 1996) (documenting the memorandum of 
understanding). 
260  See generally VCLTIO, supra note 257, at art. 6. 
       261    See supra note 44, 192–94. 
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implied powers doctrine.262  This approach has been supported by 
the UNOLA.263  In particular, the UNOLA regards the catchall 
provision of the UNFCCC as the basis for permitting either for the 
interpretation of treaty-making competence specifically or implied 
powers doctrine generally.264 
If we agree that the CSP has the capacity to enter into 
agreements, the second question is whether this capacity is objective 
or subjective, such as whether the CSP can only enter into 
agreements with the States Parties to the treaty.  In Reparations, the 
ICJ also held that the personality enjoyed by the U.N. was objective, 
as in it was opposable to any other international legal person, even 
that states that are not parties to the U.N. Charter.265  Formally, this 
holding appears to be limited to the U.N., although in practice it is 
applied beyond the U.N. and many organizations are treated as 
international legal persons by states not party to the constitutive 
treaty. 
 
7.2. Powers of the Secretariat 
 
Distinct from the CSP, the Secretariat of the treaty regime is not 
meant to be political and is usually viewed as merely an organ 
providing bureaucratic support to the regime.266  
The U.N. Secretariat is the typical model267 and secretariats of 
true international organizations do not differ significantly from 
secretariats of treaty regimes.268 
The precise duties assigned to a secretariat vary depending on 
the regime, but they usually include human resource management, 
                                                     
262  See AMERASINGHE, supra note 52, at 85; (discussing the debate surrounding 
the national and international legal personality of international tribunals).  
263  See generally UNOLA Arrangements for implementation 1993, supra note 55, 
para 6. 
264  Id. at para. 6 (citing UNFCCC, art. 7(2)). 
265  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: Adv. Op., of 
April 11th, 1949, 1949 I.C.J. Reps. 174, 185–87. 
266  See Weiss, supra note 120 at 289 (describing developments in international 
administration). 
267  See U.N. Charter, art. 97 (detailing the structure of the U.N. Secretariat and 
the appointment of the U.N. Secretary General). 
268  See generally P. SANDS & P. KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 297–98 (5th ed. 2001); Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 647. 
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procurement, and information management.269  In addition, a 
secretariat can represent the treaty regime in international 
relations.270  Beyond those tasks, secretariats may also have unique 
duties linked to the objectives of the constitutive instrument.271  
Treaties containing reporting obligations focus on receiving and 
distributing those reports.272  Although a secretariat’s duties can 
include analysis and commentary on the contents of the reports.273 
In discharging these duties, a secretariat will not be 
micromanaged by the CSP, and the precise degree of CSP control 
over a secretariat will vary from regime to regime.274  As a result, 
some secretariats have a wide degree of independence and can act 
very aggressively in pursuit of the treaty regime, while others are 
more dependent and passive.275  Two examples of secretariats that 
are widely considered very independent and active are those of the 
Biodiversity Convention and Desertification Convention.276  A more 
passive secretariat would be the UNFCCC Secretariat.277 
As for the ATT Secretariat, it is still too early to tell which 
approach it will take.  In an unusual move, States Parties to the ATT 
negotiated specific provisions on the Secretariat’s powers and role 
—perhaps implying a view that the organ’s powers should be 
                                                     
269  SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at §442–68. 
270  Id. at § 450. 
271  Id. at § 439. 
272  See Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8 (providing 
procedure for the reports to be distributed to the member states); Cluster Munitions 
Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6(3) (providing methods for distributing the given 
reports). 
273  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8(3); Montreal Protocol, Report of the 
Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, 25 November 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex IV. P 
3; CBD, The CBD Secretariat, Role, http:// www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtml. 
274  See generally F. BIERMAN & B. SIEBENHÜNER, EDS., MANAGERS OF GLOBAL 
CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES 225-
318 (2009), available at http://www.academia.edu/2032349/Managers_of_Global_ 
Change_The_Influence_of_International_Environmental_Bureaucracies; Joanna 
Depledge, A Special Relationship: Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change 
Negotiations, 7 GLOBAL ENVIRON. POL’Y 45, 54 (2007). 
275  See generally R. Sandford, Secretariats and International Environmental 
Negotiations: Two New Models, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 
27 (1992); S. Bauer, P-O Busch & B. Siebenhüner, Treaty Secretariats in Global 
Environmental Governance, in F. BIERMAN, B. SIEBENHÜNER & A. SCHREYÖGG, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 174 
(2009). 
276  B. Siebenhüner, supra note 68, at 284; S. Bauer, supra note 68, at 300. 
277  See generally P-O Busch, supra note 68, at 261. 
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carefully circumscribed.278  However, while the initial negotiations 
contemplated an “Implementation Support Unit” (“ISU”), the final 
draft changed the title of the organ to “Secretariat,”279 perhaps 
suggesting a more vigorous organ.  Much will depend on the 
decisions of the CSP (for example, those regarding funding of a 
secretariat, hiring its head, interpreting the ATT, etc.), or perhaps 
lack of decisions, and the unfolding relationship between two 
organs.  Because it will be the only organ of the regime that will 
continue to act in between sessions of the CSP, the ATT Secretariat’s 
complex duties might entail a wide degree of discretion (e.g. 
coordinating reports on highly technical weapons, and matching 
offers and requests for assistance).  For example, the organ may need 
to take a very active role out of necessity.  In fact, as the Secretariat 
develops expertise on these matters, the CSP might even consult 
with the secretariat for guidance and leadership in the future. 
The specific tasks assigned to a secretariat include (a) receiving 
and distributing reports as mandated by this treaty; (b) maintaining 
and make available to States Parties the list of national points of 
contact; (c) facilitating the matching of offers and requests for 
assistance for treaty implementation, as well as promoting 
international cooperation as requested; (d) facilitating the work of 
the Conference of States Parties, which included making 
arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings 
under this treaty; and (e) performing other duties as decided by the 
Conferences of States Parties.280 
The ATT demands that the Secretariat “shall” undertake all of 
these duties.281  This means that the organ has no discretion to refuse 
any of them.  However, there may be some discretion to prioritize 
depending on its budget and financing structure.  Furthermore, the 
Secretariat is accountable to the CSP.  Although the ATT uses an 
                                                     
278  Compare ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18 with Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, supra note 7 (absence of terms); Cluster Munitions 
Convention, supra note 7 (transparency obligations only). 
279 Compare Chairman’s Draft Paper (July 14, 2011), available at 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/ 
prepcom3/docs/ChairPaper-14July2011.pdf (referring to the ISU); UNGA, The 
arms trade treaty, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/66/166 (July 20, 
2011) (same) with ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18 (mentioning the Secretariat). 
280  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18. 
281  See id., supra note 7, art. 18(3) (describing that the Secretariat has the 
responsibilities of receiving, making available and distributing reports as 
mandated by the ATT). 
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unfortunately vague expression, “responsible to the CSP,” to 
describe their relationship.282 
Initially, in the ATT’s negotiations, it was proposed that the 
Secretariat would have two additional tasks, (1) “[e]nsur[ing] the 
necessary coordination with the secretariats of relevant 
international and regional organizations and represent[ing] the 
Implementation Support Unit in meetings and activities of such 
organizations, as applicable;” and (2) “[c]onduct[ing] outreach to 
increase awareness of the Treaty regime and to promote the 
universality of the Treaty.”283  Although the objective of 
universalization was retained and vested in the CSP, both of these 
duties were dropped from the final draft.284  This history does not 
mean the Secretariat is unable undertake these tasks.  The Secretariat 
could be assigned such duties by the CSP under article 18(3)(e) 
(“other duties”).285  However, the treaty does not mandate the 
Secretariat to do them, and the CSP has the authority to retain more 
control over them if they are assigned. 
 
7.2.1. Distributing documentation 
 
The Secretariat will receive required reports from the member 
states and distribute them among the membership.286  Having 
reporting obligations is typical of other similar conventions, 
although some delegate the administration to a body outside the 
treaty regime, such as the U.N. Secretary-General.287  The ATT 
                                                     
282  Id. 
283  Chairman’s Draft Paper (July 14, 2011), available at  
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/ 
prepcom3/docs/ChairPaper-14July2011.pdf. 
284  See id. at 17(4)(b) (stating that the conference of States Parties have the 
responsibility of considering and adopting recommendations regarding the 
implementation of the treaty). 
285  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18(3)(e) 
286  See id., at 18(3)(a) (describing that the Secretariat has the responsibilities of 
receiving, making available, and distributing reports as mandated by the ATT). 
287  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, art. 8 (relating to 
the role of the U.N. Secretary-General); Cluster Munitions Convention, supra note 
7, art. 6(3) (addressing the role of the Secretary-General). 
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mandates a variety of reporting obligations,288 and in all cases the 
Secretariat is the point of contact for reporting.289  The Secretariat 
also serves the same function for the optional reporting 
mechanisms.290 
One issue that remains unclear in the ATT is whether the 
Secretariat can have any substantive role or take initiative in the 
reporting obligation.  Other treaty regimes provide that a secretariat 
may request information, respond to inquiries for information (for 
example, on other states’ compliance), digest and summarize the 
contents of reports, and identify or comment on notable aspects of 
the reports—especially noncompliance.291  One reasonable step 
would be to make reports publicly available.292 
Many secretariats take the approach of promulgating reporting 
or compliance guidelines.293  State parties might take a variety of 
approaches to structuring their reports.  This makes comparative 
compliance assessment difficult and potentially necessitates a 
standardized format.  The Secretariat should be mindful of the 
preference of the States Parties to avoid duplicating work already 
undertaken by other treaty organs and organizations when 
discharging this task.294  By doing so, the Secretariat could 
promulgate reporting guidelines that are harmonized with (or 
integrated into) the many arms control agreements already in force 
                                                     
288  See, e.g., supra note 200, at 5(4), 13(1), 13(3). See also ATT, supra note 1, at art. 
13(1) (discussing national measures), 13(2) (concerning measures addressing 
diversion). 
289  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 13(1) 
290  See supra note 200, at 11(6), 13(2) (encouraging reporting of transferred 
conversion arms to other states party to the convention). 
291  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, art. 2(D)(43) (relating to the role of the secretariat 
in the treaty regime); Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, Den., Nov. 23-25, 1992, 
Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex V, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (Nov. 25, 
1992) (discussing the role of the secretariat in the treaty regime).  
292  See, e.g., CITES, supra note 10 at art. XII(2)(f) (finding that the Secretariat 
will have the function to publish and distribute editions of appendices and any 
information to help identification of species in those appendices within the treaty 
regime). 
293  See, e.g., Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2007, Ramsar Handbooks for the 
Wise Use of Wetlands, available at http://www.ramsar.org (providing guidelines). 
294  See, e.g., supra note 50 (addressing the response of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina); id. (discussing the response of Costa Rica); id. (discussing the U.K.’s 
response to work duplication of other treaty organs). 
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that also require reporting.295  It was already mentioned above that 
the ATT reporting requirements are structured similarly to the 
UNROCA lists and the obligation under ATT article 5(3) to use the 
weapon descriptions used in the UNROCA classification system.296  
For this reason, it is likely that the CSP could require reports to be 
structured similarly, if not harmonized and combined outright.  
Several States Parties have asked the UNODA how to combine their 
reporting obligations under the UNROCA and ATT, and the 
UNODA is currently studying the issue.297  The task of creating 
harmonized reporting templates could very well be assigned to the 
Secretariat, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
                                                     
295  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/36L, U.N. Doc.  A/RES/46/36L (Dec. 6, 1991),                 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Register/4636.html (creating 
UNROCA and requesting all U.N. member states to provide information on their 
imports and exports of weapons).  Other arms control reporting regimes include:  
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies,  Munitions List Categories ML1 & ML2 (July 2014), 
available at http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/5%20-%20Initial% 
20Elements.pdf; European Union annual report on arms exports, L335 OJ EU 99-
103 (Dec. 13, 2008); OAS Treaty No. A-64; ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (June 14, 2006), 
available at http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/en/ecosap/strategic_docs/ 
convention/convention_small_arms.pdf; Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP (Dec. 8, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/26 (Dec. 5, 2007) (establishing the U.N. 
Exchange of National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and 
Dual-use Goods and Technology); G.A. Res. 60/69 (Dec. 8, 2005); G.A. Res. 59/66,  
U.N. Doc.  A/RES/59/66 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/ 
other/UNGARsn/2003/95.pdf; S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 
2004), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ 
Documents/1540.pdf (obliging states to adopt measures to prohibit certain non-
state actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and report on 
measures to the “1540 Committee,” which is a subsidiary body of the U.N. Security 
Council);  S.C. Res. 1518,, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1518  (2003), available at http://www. 
customs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/876D72D9-7B10-4881-9189-CC5E76B07CAC/ 
21885/UNSCResolution15182003.pdf; G.A. Res. 58/42 (Dec. 8, 2003; G.A.Res. 
57/66, ¶ U.N. Doc.  A/RES/57/66 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/2002/144.pdf (establishing the 
U.N. Exchange of National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment 
and Dual-use Goods and Technology); U.N. Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 192/15 (July 20, 2001; OSCE, Document on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, para. 1, § I (Nov. 24, 2000) Inter-American Convention on 
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (June 7, 1999). 
296  However, it is important to observe that the reporting obligations under 
the ATT and U.N. ROCA are not identical.  For example, reporting on small arms 
is required under the ATT but is only “voluntary” under the U. N. ROCA. 
297  See supra note 64 (concerning the reporting obligations of states).   
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In some treaty regimes, States Parties have even requested the 
assistance of the treaty regime secretariat when drafting their report, 
going so far as to delegate the entire preparation of the report.298  
Some secretariats go beyond reporting guidelines and produce 
advice on correct implementation of the treaty.  For example, some 
produce compliance handbooks299 or operational manuals.300  One 
issue that remains unclear in these cases is whether the treaty organ 
would bear some measure of shared responsibility if the reporting 
obligation did not comply with the ATT.  The ATT merely says that 
the “Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties,” and from the 
context implies that the responsibility must be used in the sense of 
accountability.301 
 
7.2.2. Coordinating cooperation 
 
The Secretariat plays an important role in matching offers and 
requests from states for assistance in implementing the ATT.  The 
Secretariat, for example, will develop lists of designated national 
points of contact for exchange of information,302 and will, most likely 
use those lists to find implementation partners.303  A few questions 
arise in this context—namely whether the Secretariat must 
discharge this duty in confidence (especially vis-à-vis nonparty 
                                                     
298  See, e.g., United Nations, Convention to Combat the Desertification in 
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought And/Or Desertification, 
Particularly in Africa, Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee, declaration of 
June 17, 1994, A/ AC. 241/15/Rev.7,  33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994) (addressing issues for 
developing states); CITES, supra note 10, art. XII (2)(d), (g) (permitting the 
secretariat to ask for further information and report to the CSP if there is failure to 
comply with a request). 
299  See, e.g., Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2007, RAMSAR HANDBOOKS FOR THE 
WISE USE OF WETLANDS (4th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ramsar.org 
(handbook).  
300  See Test-Ban Treaty, art. 2(D) (44) (detailing development of an operation 
manual to guide the operation of the verification regime), available at 
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf. 
301  See supra note 200, at 18(3) (listing the general responsibilities of the 
secretariat). 
302  See supra note 200, at 5(6), 18(3)(b) (empowering the creation of national 
points of contact to exchange information). 
303  See supra note 200, at 18(3)(c) (stating that the Secretariat should match 
offers of assistance with requests for assistance, and promote international 
cooperation as needed). 
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observers)304 and the degree to which the Secretariat can take an 
active role in promoting assistance and cooperation.  The ATT only 
provides that the Secretariat must “facilitate” assistance in 
implementation and cooperation.305 
To compare, other secretariats have developed extensive 
capacity by building projects to promote implementation, even 
where this task is not in its constitutive instrument.306  Activities 
could include engaging in direct advice to States Parties, developing 
training programs or consultation processes.307  But, as with many 
of the other considerations in the section, financing for these 
activities will be crucial to their operation.308 
One alternative to active implementation assistance from a 
Secretariat would be for states to look to other actors for assistance 
in ATT implementation.  For example, the UNODA is already 
providing assistance, on request, to states for implementation.309  In 
addition to developing programs for raising awareness and 
developing implementation legislation, UNODA has developed an 
“ATT Implementation Toolkit” to provide guidance on treaty 
implementation.310  This toolkit was introduced at the Berlin 
preparatory consultation for CSP1; similar programs are already 
underway at the UNODA centers in Lima, Lomé, and 
Kathmandu.311  With donor funding, the UNODA has also 
developed the U.N. Trust Facility Supporting Conventional Arms 
Regulation (“UNSCAR”) for awarding funding on a competitive 
basis to ATT implementation projects by a variety of civil society 
                                                     
304  See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, art. 12(d)(f) (specifying the role of notifying 
non-party observers). 
305  See supra note 200, at 18(3)(c). 
306
 See generally B. Siebenhüner, Administrator of Global Biodiversity: The 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 7 BIODIV. & CONSERV. 259, 266 
(2007). 
307  Id. at 269. See also Desertification Convention, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 
18(4), Annex II, art. 8(3) and Annex III, art. 7(2) (describing the Secretariat’s abilities 
to engage various consultative processes); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra 
note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), (39), (42), (45) (describing the mechanisms by which 
the Secretariat can assist in accomplishing group tasks). 
308  See generally Siebenhüner, supra note 223 at 265-6. 
309  UNODA, Gamba, Looking ahead, supra note 62 at 5. 
310  See generally UNODA, Gamba, Looking ahead, supra note 62 at 5; UNODA, 
Kane, Presentation, supra note 64 at 4. 
311  UNODA, Gamba, Looking ahead, supra note 62 at 5. 
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organizations.312  The European Union, in partnership with the 
UNODA, has created an EU ATT assistance package.313  The 
UNODA office in Lima has already developed an ATT 
implementation-training manual and has completed its first training 
session for experts and officials in the region.314 
 
7.2.3. Supporting the CSP 
 
As stated by the ATT, the final task of the Secretariat is to 
support the CSP.  Among other duties, the Secretariat should 
specifically “(d) [f]acilitate the work of the Conference of States 
Parties, including making arrangements and providing the 
necessary services for meetings under this Treaty”; and “(e) 
[p]erform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States 
Parties.”315 
Some duties in this category such as administrative, secretarial, 
and logistical services are very typical of a secretariat.316  Other 
duties such as circulating amendment proposals and convening 
future meetings of the CSP can be inferred.  While neither of these 
duties is explicit in the ATT, both can be safely understood as 
assigned to the Secretariat.  One source of amendment proposals are 
States Parties.317  Amendment proposals made by States Parties 
must be communicated to the Secretariat and, in turn, the Secretariat 
is charged with circulating other communications.318  While other 
treaties have made this task explicit, the ATT may implicitly make 
the Secretariat the conduit for all communication related to treaty 
                                                     
312  See id. (UNSCAR also provides funding for POA implementation projects, 
as well as projects addressing the interaction of the ATT and POA). 
313  See generally UNODA, Gamba, Looking ahead, supra note 62 at 5; UNODA, 
Kane, Presentation, supra note 64 at 4. 
314  See generally id.; UNODA, Kane, Presentation, supra note 64 at 4. . 
315  ATT, supra note 1, at art. 18(3)(d). 
316  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), 
(39), (42), (45) (stating the various responsibilities of the Secretariat); Test-Ban 
Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D)(45) (describing the responsibilities of the Secretariat); 
Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, art. 8 (stating the responsibilities 
that the Secretariat has under the convention). 
317  ATT, supra  note 1, at art. 20(1). 
318  See id. at art. 20(2) (stating the Secretariat’s duty to circulate amendments 
and proposals that he or she receives). 
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matters.319  In addition, while the first meeting of the CSP must be 
convened by the provisional Secretariat,320 the permanent 
Secretariat will convene future meetings of the CSP, as directed, by 
the CSP although the power to do so is not specifically granted to 
the Secretariat.  Furthermore, some tasks such as accounting could 
also be understood as implied, even though other treaty regimes 
make those tasks explicit.321  It will then be interesting to determine 
how much discretion the Secretariat has, for example, in inviting 
observers or members of civil society to future meetings of the CSP 
when the Secretariat’s exercise’s the power to convene meetings falls 
under the direction of the CSP itself.322 
Presumably, the Secretariat will have some role in providing 
similar support if the CSP creates any subsidiary organs, but there 
is no reason to think that the specific tasks need to be identical to 
those rendered to the CSP.  For example, some secretariats have a 
special role in dealing with the reports of subsidiary organs 
composed of experts.323  For subsidiary organs drawing on a 
separate budget, a related concern would be the secretariats costs for 
those particular tasks.324 
Looking at the catchall provision of (e), we can wonder what 
unwritten tasks the CSP might assign.  Catchall provisions of this 
nature are quite common in other treaties that establish 
secretariats.325  Some tasks that may be relevant in the context of the 
ATT include administering lists of experts on substantive matters 
                                                     
319  See Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D)(43) (stating that the Secretariat 
is directly responsible for conveying proposals that she receives). 
320  See ATT, supra note 1, art. 17(1) (establishing the Secretariat’s ability to 
convene meetings). 
321  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D)(47) (establishing that the 
Secretariat is directly responsible for accounting requirements). 
322  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, art. 12(e)-(f) (discussing the extent of 
the Secretariat’s responsibilities regarding future meetings). 
323  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8(3) (tasking the Secretariat with 
the responsibility of circulating reports from expert review teams); Chemical 
Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), (39), (42), (45) (requiring 
the Secretariat to assist the various councils in performing the tasks assigned to 
them). 
324  See, e.g., Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 UNTS 257, art. 31(3) (declaring that costs incurred by 
the Secretariat shall be covered in a manner that is determined by the parties at the 
first meeting). 
325  See, e.g. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17 art. VIII(D)(37) 
(broadly stating that the Secretariat is responsible for all tasks assigned to it by the 
convention). 
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such as weaponry technology and on procedural matters such as 
weapons inspection,326 or maintaining weaponry databases.327 
There are a number of tasks that could arguably fall under (d) or 
(e).  Among others, they include conducting research on topical 
issues (e.g. emerging technologies),328 preparing the agenda or 
executive summaries of documents,329 preparing of the draft 
budget,330 advising on procedural matters,331 drafting an annual 
report on operation of the treaty,332 or even advising on compliance 
issues in reports.333  Although it is unusual, some secretariats have 
even been requested to conduct studies and advise the CSP on 
substantive matters334 or even draft proposals for adoption.335.  Even 
                                                     
326  See Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(9) (requiring the 
Secretariat to compile and distribute a list of qualified experts). 
327  See Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D) (42) (tasking the Secretariat 
with the responsibility to assist the States Parties in fulfilling their responsibilities). 
328  See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 17, art. 8(2)(b) (requiring the secretariat to 
compile and transmit reports); Desertification Convention, supra note 11, art. 
23(2)(c) (requiring the secretariat to specifically help affected developing country 
parties in compiling and communicating information required under the 
convention). 
329  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), 
(39), (42), (45) (making the Director-General responsible for the organization and 
functioning of the advisory board); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D) 
(45)(detailing the Secretariat’s duties regarding verification of compliance). 
330  See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), 
(39), (42), (45) (requiring the Secretariat to prepare and submit a draft of the budget); 
Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D) (45) (requiring the Secretariat to prepare 
and submit a draft budget). 
331  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), 
(39), (42), (45) (requiring the Secretariat is responsible for assisting the conference 
and the Executive Council); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D) (45)(requiring 
the Secretariat to provide administrative and technical support to the conference 
and its organs). 
332  See Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. II(D) (45) (requiring the Secretariat 
to prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the organization 
as well as any other reports required by the Treaty). 
333  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8(3) (requiring that the 
Secretariat assist in meeting the requirements of the reports set forth by the Treaty); 
Montreal Protocol, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Nov. 25, 1992), U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, ann. IV. at 3 (stating the compliance requirements that the 
Secretariat is to provide assistance to the parties required to adhere). 
334  See CITES, supra note 10, art. VIII(4)(b), (c) (advising on the action to be 
taken when a live controlled species is discovered) and art. XII(2)(c), (h) 
(undertaking technical studies and advising on decisions). 
335  See Volker Röben, Institutional Developments under Modern International 
Environmental Agreements, 4 MAX PLANCK YB U.N. LAW 363, 423–24 (2000) (arguing 
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procedural tasks such as drafting agendas may have effects on the 
substantive work of the CSP.336  Thus, they turn on the larger 
question of how active the Secretariat will be.  In this comparative 
study, the secretariats of proper international organizations tended 
to take a more active role than those of treaty regimes.337  
Unlike the CSP, the Secretariat does not have the explicit task of 
interpreting the ATT; however, depending on the nature of the tasks 
assigned to it and the degree of discretion awarded, the Secretariat 
may need to interpret the treaty itself.  It could be that the Secretariat 
(presumably its legal counsel) is asked to render legal advice on the 
application of the treaty to the CSP,338 but the active interpretation 
could be inherent in many of the Secretariat’s tasks.339  This inherent 
interpretation is the norm for other secretariats of the treaty 
regimes.340 
Lastly, unlike the CSP, the Secretariat has not been expressly 
granted the authority to create subsidiary bodies.  It is certainly 
possible for a secretariat to have this power granted by the 
constitutive instrument, though that is more common for 
secretariats of true international organizations,341 organs that under 
general principles of international institutional law are usually 
                                                     
that the Secretariat will be able to pre-structure the issues that are addressed at the 
meetings).  
336  Id. at 424 (describing the influence that the Secretariat has due to its 
responsibility in setting the agenda and organizing the meetings). 
337  See Test-Ban Treaty, art. II(D) (45) (describing the Secretariats role in the 
meetings); Chemical Weapons Convention, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), (39), (42), (45) 
(describing the Secretariats role and responsibilities). 
338  See Röben, supra note 336 at 431, n. 212 (noting that the CITES secretariat 
once rendered an opinion that a CSP decision was incompatible with the treaty). 
339  See, e.g., ATT, art. 18(3)(c) (“[f]acilitate the matching of offers of and 
requests for assistance for Treaty implementation . . .”). 
340  For example, the Biodiversity Convention Secretariat has supported the 
implementation of the convention by compiling and synthesizing national reports, 
see CBD Secretariat, Role, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtml, which is a 
more-involved process than the less-filtered process forwarding of reports to the 
Expert Review Teams conducted by the Kyoto Protocol, see art. 8(3) (discussing the 
review process, stating the Secretariat’s responsibilities of circulation, and listing 
questions of implementation), and Desertification Convention, see art. 26(6) (laying 
out the Secretariat’s role in communicating information to the Conference of the 
Parties and any subsidiary bodies). 
341  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, art. II(D)(45) (listing the functions of the 
Secretariat with respect to administrative matters);  id. at art . II(D)(51) (noting the 
power of the Director-General as head of the secretariat to establish “temporary 
working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific 
issues”). 
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regarded to have the inherent power to create subsidiaries.  This 
power might be granted to it by the CSP or the CSP might exercise 
the power on behalf of the Secretariat.  
 
7.2.4. Compliance monitoring 
 
Moving beyond the powers that are express (or implied by 
express terms) in the ATT, the Secretariat has not been given the 
power to initiate an investigation of the compliance issue of the 
States Parties independently.  That does not mean that such a power 
is impossible to grant to the ATT Secretariat, since other secretariats 
do enjoy it.342  In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina did suggest in 
negotiations that the Secretariat should have a compliance 
monitoring function.343  In the final draft that power was not 
granted, and it seems difficult to identify whether it has been 
implied, although we may be able to understand that the Secretariat 
has the much more mild indirect monitoring function involved in 
receiving reports, as discussed above. 
 
7.2.5. Entering into international agreements 
 
Some secretariats of treaty regimes are able to engage in 
negotiations, communications, and corporations among different 
international parties to a degree.  This engagement can be mere 
diplomatic coordination among regimes or even negotiating 
binding agreements.  Quite a few regimes authorize the Secretariat 
to take its own initiative to coordinate with other regimes,344 
                                                     
342  See Test-Ban Treaty art. II(D)(42), (43) (vesting the Technical Secretariat’s 
responsibilities of verification of compliance with the Secretariat); Chemical 
Weapons Convention, art. VIII(D)(37), (38), (39), (42),(45) (establishing that the 
Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification measures provided for in this 
Convention). 
343  See UNGA, Towards an arms trade treaty, supra note 6 (response of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, para. 24) (arguing that the secretariat should be confined to 
“serve as a point of contact for national reports and information sharing, capacity-
building assistance and as a basis for any fact-finding mechanism”). 
344  See generally UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and 
Cooperation: A Status Report on Activities Promoting Synergies and Cooperation between 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in Particular Biodiversity-Related Conventions 
and Related Mechanisms, Status Report (May 2004), available at http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/system/dataset_file_fields/files/000/000/048/original/Synergies___c
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although the usual practice is for the CSP to authorize the action.  
These coordination activities range from sharing information345 to 
forming joint fact-finding missions.346  In addition, some secretariats 
even negotiate Memoranda of Understanding with other bodies,347 
                                                     
ooperation.pdf?1395762968 (demonstrating the collaboration between convention 
secretariats to coordinate harmonization and synergy projects through 
biodiversity-related conventions and related mechanisms); UNEP, Prague 
Declaration on Enhancing Cooperation among Chemicals-Related Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (2004), available at  http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/ 
MP_Handbook/Section_3.8_Annexes_Declarations/Prague_Declaration.shtml, 
reproduced in Meeting Of the Parties, UNEP, Report of the Executive Director to the 
Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/2, Annex V (Sep. 13, 2004), available at http://montreal-
protocol.org/new_site/en/meeting_documents.php?mdt_id=1&m_id=15; COP 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity on the Work of Its Ninth Meeting, IX/27: 
Cooperation among Multilateral Environment Agreements and Other 
Organizations, U.N. Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/27, ann. I, 193 (Oct. 9, 2008), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/cop-09-dec-27en.pdf. 
345  See Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, art. 
XXXVII(5)(a), opened for signature June 17, 1999 – June 18, 2000, 2331 U.N.T.S. 202 
(adopted June 17, 1999), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ 
env/documents/2000/wat/mp.wat.2000.1.e.pdf [hereinafter Transboundary 
Watercourses Convention] (stating the Secretariat’s function  the transmission to 
the Parties of reports and other information received in accordance with the 
provisions of the Protocol); Report of the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on 
Water and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes on Its First Meeting, Decision I/2 – Review 
of Compliance, July 3, 2007, ESCOR, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3, 
EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3, ann. 9,  available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/ 
DAM/env/documents/2007/wat/wh/ece.mp.wh.2_add_3.e.pdf (for example, 
the Committee may transmit information to the secretariats of other international 
environmental agreements for consideration); Resolution Conference 11.3,  available 
at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/11/E11-03R15.pdf (listing several functions 
of the Secretariat, including requesting information and offering advices). 
346  See Joint Mission of the Expert Team of the European Commission and 
International Conventions to the ‘Bystroe Project’ in the Ukrainian Part of the 
Danube Delta, Mission Report of the Expert Team (Nov. 17, 2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/bystroe_docs/ bystroe_joint_mission_ 
report.pdf (describing the responsibilities of the parties to obtain information). 
347   For examples of memorandum of understanding and cooperation between 
secretariats, see, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretariat of the 
Basel Convention, on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal (SBC) and the Secretariat of the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (the Ozone Secretariat) and the Secretariat of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) (Apr. 26, 2002), available at http://www.cites.org/common/disc/sec/ 
CITES-BASEL-OZONE.pdf (the Secretariats will jointly draft and implement 
measures to improve collaboration and information between their Competent 
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although these instruments are usually considered non-binding and 
some even expressly exclude legal effect.348  Furthermore, there are 
small numbers of secretariats that can negotiate administrative-
binding international agreements.349  To some degree, this issue will 
only be relevant if the ATT Secretariat is not housed in the 
Secretariat of an existing international organization.  If it were, then 
the host organization could enter into any necessary agreements, 
but it was not then its capacity would be an issue. 
 
                                                     
Authorities); Memorandum of Cooperation Between Agencies to Support the 
Achievement of the 2010 Biodiversity Target (Sept. 15, 2006), U.N.E.P. No. 59516, 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmt-hoetf-cites-2006-10-15-
moc-web-en.pdf (demonstrating the collaboration between international agencies 
to achieve biological diversity); Memorandum of Cooperation between the 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Secretariat of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, (Oct. 28, 
2010) (noting this memorandum is between the Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Secretariat of the International Treaty on Plant Generic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture); Memoranda of understanding and 
cooperation with other conventions and international organizations, The Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands, May 27, 2013 available at http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ 
en/ramsar-documents-mous/main/ramsar/1-31-115_4000_0_; (creating an 
understanding with other societies); Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme and the Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (Feb. 16, 2009), available at  
http://www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmt-sprep-2009-02-16-mou-web-en.pdf 
(demonstrating collaboration between the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity within specific geographical areas). 
348  For examples of agreements that are binding see, e.g., Memorandum of 
Understanding between CCAMLR and WCPFC, Arrangement between The 
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean and The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources Annex 6 (Nov. 2008) (specifically stating that the 
Arrangement does not create legally binding obligations); Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty-Eighth 
Meeting of the Commission, Report SC-CAMLR-XXVIII, ann. 8, Memorandum of 
Understanding between CCAMLR and ACAP (Nov. 2009) (the MOU is not legally 
binding between participants). 
349  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII (D)(39) 
(“The Technical Secretariat shall Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to 
the implementation of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval 
by the Executive Council”); Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 11, at art. II(D) (43) (granting 
the authority to make and “approve” arrangements with 
States Parties, other States and international organizations”); Biodiversity 
Convention, supra note 11, at art. 24(1)(d) (the Secretariat’s functions include 
entering into administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for 
the effective discharge of its functions). 
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8. LEGAL EFFECT OF ACTS 
 
Following from the powers of the new ATT treaty regime, the 
next question would be the legal effects of its organs’ activities.  
Some arms control treaties, especially those that do not create a CSP, 
explicitly permit resort to the UNSC for investigation and/or 
enforcement of the treaty.350  This explicit provision is probably not 
necessary since the underlying obligations themselves, where they 
threaten peace, should already be a topic that could seize the UNSC.  
This section is not concerned with the possibility of enforcement of 
international legal obligations through normal international legal 
means, but rather the legal effect of the acts of the CSP itself. 
The types of decisions that CSPs can reach are quite varied.  
Some decisions are designated “resolutions,” “recommendations,” 
“decisions,” or other names, and those designations might suggest 
differing legal value.351  The temptation is to find meaningful 
normative distinctions between these types, but there is little 
uniformity or guidance in this matter. 
 
8.1. Not binding 
 
The usual understanding for CSPs is that their decisions, 
whether they are called recommendations or decisions, or 
something else, are not legally binding,352 but that does not mean 
that these views are not contested.353  Fitzmaurice and Merkouris 
                                                     
350  See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 184, at art. VI (stating that 
any State Party to the Convention may lodge a complaint with the UNSC should it 
find that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations). 
351  See, e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6 (stating that the 
Contracting Parties shall meet as the needs arise in an advisory capacity). 
352  For examples of conventions that present decisions as less than legally 
binding see, e.g., Inter-American Trafficking Convention, supra note 43, at art. XX(2) 
(“Decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be recommendatory in nature”); 
Cluster Munitions Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8 (the State Parties are limited 
to making clarifications and recommendations to other State Parties in order to 
facilitate compliance with the obligations of the Convention); Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Envtl Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that EPA rule 
was sufficient injury in fact for standing, and Montreal Protocol were not ‘‘law’’ 
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act and were not enforceable in federal court). 
353  See, e.g., R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 641 –42 (discussing the 
importance of COP’s interpretation of the provisions of MEAs); Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part II, 22 HAGUE Y.B. 
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argue that CSP decisions could be understood to be simply another 
means of state consent to treaty obligations, as states are free under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to establish the 
manner of their consent,354 but that view necessitates that CSP 
decisions be assimilated to treaties.  It has alternatively been 
suggested that the doctrine of implied powers alone might result in 
the legally binding nature of decisions of the CSP,355 but this 
conclusion is difficult to sustain since the legally binding nature of 
the decision would have to be the necessary intendment of the 
parties.  Given the lengthy experience of the international 
community with treaties creating CSPs, one might expect such a 
provision to now be explicit if it were intended to be granted.  In any 
analysis, the phenomenon is clearly highly flexible and informal 
regarding law. 
 
8.2. Explicitly binding 
 
It is generally understood that, even where the treaty permits the 
CSP to adopt measures against states for non-compliance, that the 
legally binding effect would need to be explicit, or the measures 
would be considered non-binding.356  Thus in some cases, the treaty 
                                                     
INT’L L. J. 4 (2009) (discussing the evaluative interpretations and legislative 
techniques based on multilateral environmental agreements, and the implied 
power of the organs of the MEAs); Jutta Brunnée, Reweaving the Fabric of 
International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environmental Framework Agreements, in 
RÖBEN EDS DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 101 (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005) (analyzing multilateral environmental 
agreements, and highlighting shifting patterns of consent, intertwined with subtle 
but significant shifts of decision-making from the States Parties to an MEA to its 
Conference of the Parties). 
354  See M. Fitzmaurice & P. Merkouris, Uniformity versus Specialization (1): The 
Quest for a Uniform Law of Inter-State Treaties, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES (C. Tams et al. eds., 2014) (providing an overview of the genesis and life 
of a treaty, and analyzing the existence of a characteristics of uniformity of the 
relevant provisions amongst inter-State treaties). 
355  See R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 633–34 (discussing the 
application of international institutional law and its implied power). 
356  See Exec. Body for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, Rep., 15th Sess., Dec. 16–19, 1997, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/53, para. 48 
(Jan. 7, 1998), available at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/executivebody/eb_ 
decision.htm (“[T]he Executive Body’s decisions concerning compliance were not 
legally binding unless a provision in the protocol in question rendered them so”); 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 18 (“The provisions of Article 14 of the 
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provides that decisions of the CSP are legally-binding,357  but other 
substantive decisions are not, such as the rules for emissions trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol.358  Some CSPs are empowered to amend 
the treaty or issue decisions similar to regulations; whereas others 
establish “enabling clauses,” authorizing the CSP to adopt rules 
further elaborating on the obligations in the treaty.359  Where this 
power to bind exists, courts have recognized that the decisions 
would have legal effect.360  This is not the case with the ATT. 
 
8.3. Clarifying the treaty 
 
Another way that the decisions of the CSP might be legally-
binding is where the CSP alters the treaty text through amendment 
or simply alters an annex of scheduled items.  These alternatives 
have been discussed above. 
A further possibility is for the CSP to adopt decisions clarifying 
or providing more detail for existing obligations.  In other contexts, 
these nominally decisions have been seen to have binding effect.361 
The Court of Appeals for the Washington, D.C. Circuit in the Natural 
Resources Defense Council case suggested that the decisions of the 
CSP would at least be strong indications of the meaning of the treaty, 
                                                     
Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to this 
Protocol.”). 
357  See Bonn Convention, supra note 11, at art. 17 (providing procedure for 
when amendments shall enter in force). 
358  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 17 (stating that the Conference of 
the Parties has an obligation to define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines—in  particular for verification–reporting, and accountability pertaining 
to emissions trading). 
359  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 8 (authorizing CSP to adopt 
procedure and mechanisms for assessing compliance with the treaty's obligations, 
with more specificity than the more vague treaty terms).  
360  See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that the EPA rule was sufficient injury in fact for standing but 
the Montreal Protocol was not ‘‘law’’ within the meaning of the Clean Air Act; 
therefore, the rule was not enforceable in federal court).  
361  See e.g. U.N.G.A. Res. 2323 (XXII), 22d Sess., 1635th plen. Mtg., (Dec. 18, 
1967) (urging states to adhere to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the U.N.); U.N. Doc. A/C.6/385 (U.N. legal counsel arguing before the Sixth 
Committee that the Convention was merely clarifying the immunities of the U.N., 
so the Resolution bound states to the Convention regardless of adherence).  See also 
Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 2(9) (authorizing the COP to adopt changes 
to the binding ozone-depleting substances allowances). 
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but only where the treaty was vague.362  Wiersema argues, however, 
that the decision in that case created new obligations and did not 
simply clarify existing ones.363  She points to the Lac Wetland case as 
possible guidance.364  In this case, the Dutch Government adopted 
the view that the decisions (“resolutions” and “recommendations”) 
of the CSP about the Ramsar Convention are to be treated as having 
a binding legal effect.365  The reason behind such undertaking was 
that the Ramsar Convention was deliberately vague on the part of 
its obligations and that the CSP was created to clarify such 
commitments.366  That conclusion by the Dutch Government is not 
entirely satisfactory.  The CSP decided that parties must perform 
environmental impact studies, which does not appear to be directly 
clarifying any particular treaty provision.  Be that as it may, it 
appears that in areas in which substantive obligations of the ATT 
remain unclear, the CSP may have a role, following the emerging 
practice of CSPs generally, to clarify or supplement the existing 
obligations. 
 
8.4. Establish criteria for compliance 
 
In addition to the power to make substantive changes to the text 
of the treaty, the CSP often has a significant role in determining the 
format, the means and methods of implementing any obligations 
under the relevant treaty.  This power is especially important for 
determining the criteria used for deciding which items to list.367  The 
                                                     
362  NRDC, 464 F.3d at 9 (“The ‘decisions’ are useful only to the extent they 
shed light on ambiguous terms in the Protocol.”). 
363  See A. Wiersema, The New International Law-Maker? Conferences of the Parties 
to Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 231 (2009) (arguing that 
certain ruling have resulted in more ambiguity than before). 
364  See id. (citing Jonathan M. Verschuuren, Ramsar Soft Law Is Not Soft at All, 
available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/wurc/wurc_verschuuren_bonaire.pdf) 
(translating and summarizing the Netherlands Crown Decision of 11 September 
2007). 
365  Id.  
366  See generally id. 
367  See M.J. Bowman, The Ramsar Convention Comes of Age, XLII NETH. INT’L L. 
REV. 1 (1995), available at http://archive.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-
wurl-laws-ramsar-convention-in-20942/main/ramsar/1-31-116-165%5E20942_ 
4000_0__ (providing example of establishing criteria). 
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CSPs have also developed guidance on listing.368  Some of these 
articles appear quite innocuous since they only lay down reporting 
or monitoring mechanisms369 but they can have significant impact 
on the operation of the treaty.370 
The precise details of reporting obligations will not be discussed 
in this article, but for purposes of the discussion on the powers of 
the CSP, it is noteworthy that the ATT only requires minimal content 
in the report.371  Since the ATT calls for a significant amount of 
information over a range of topics, reports may differ from each 
other in terms of scope and structure.372  Presumably, the States 
Parties will want to be able to easily access and compare information 
in the reports, so a wise solution is to have a reporting template.373 
As discussed above under the powers of the Secretariat, the CSP 
could develop such templates or the Secretariat could (perhaps to be 
later adopted by the CSP), or they could even be developed by the 
                                                     
368  See e.g., Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, 
Iran, 1971), 8th mtg., Nov. 18–26, 2002, Additional Guidance for Identifying and 
Designating Under-Represented Wetland Types as Wetlands of International Importance, 
Res. VIII.11 (highlighting and elaborating on certain points); Conference of the 
Parties to CITES, June 3–15, 2007, Criteria for amendment of appendices I and II, Conf. 
9.24 (Rev. CoP14) (amending Res. Conf. 9.24 (1994)); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, 
at arts. 6, 12, 17 (describing the methods of the agreement). 
369  See, e.g., Rev. of Res., Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP14), Trade in Elephant Specimens, 
CoP15 Doc. 18, Annex 7,  (requiring regular reports); Rep. of the U.N.F.C.C.C, 
Implications of Possible Changes to the Limit for Small-Scale Afforestation and 
Reforestation Clean Development Mechanism Project Activities, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) (discussing previous reporting). 
370
 See, e.g., Enhancing the Information on Wetlands of International 
Importance (Ramsar Sites), Res. VIII.13, Conference of the Contracting Parties to 
the Convention on Wetlands, 8th mtg., Nov. 18–26, 2002(detailing aspects with 
requests and suggestions). 
371  See ATT art. 13(1) (stating “national laws, national control lists, and other 
regulations implementing the treaty”).  See also id. at art. 13(3) (stating that the 
report “may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant 
United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of 
Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national 
security information.”). 
372  The initial reports under the U.N. Program of Action that were not 
comparable with each other until a standardized template was adopted.  See P. 
Holtom, and M. Bromley, Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting 
and Monitoring from Existing Mechanisms, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 28 (July 2011), 
available at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP28.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2015). 
373  See S. Bauer, P. Beijer & M. Bromley, supra note 39, at 3 (describing the 
various frameworks for reporting under a convention or treaty). 
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preparatory meetings for CSP (perhaps again for adoption by the 
CSP). 
Thus there is considerable room for the CSP to clarify and add 
explanations to the articles of the treaty without the need to alter the 
specific language.  For example, the CSP may not require the 
inclusion of commercially sensitive or national security information, 
but it could commercial sensitivity that is used in any requirement. 
Also as discussed above, the CSP and/or the Secretariat may, after 
consultation with other entities, require a reporting template that is 
harmonized with other reporting regimes. 
 
8.5. Internal decisions 
 
Where the treaty is silent, we can apply the normal principle of 
international institutional law that “internal” decisions (i.e. 
decisions regarding internal governance) are binding.374  Ulfstein 
argues that “substantive law-making” power by the CSP, such as 
altering the obligations on the parties, can be limited by the 
constitutive instrument but “internal law-making”, such as 
providing internal rules of operation, does not have the same 
limitation.375  Thus, for example, decisions governing the Secretariat 
and its budget would be binding.  Similarly, decisions governing the 
creation and operation of subsidiary bodies must be seen as binding 
on those bodies.376  Aside from these decisions, all other decisions 
should not be presumed as binding. 
 
8.6. External decisions 
 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the treaty that specifies the 
binding force of the CSP’s findings in reviewing implementation, 
                                                     
374  For arguments of why internal agreements are not binding see C.F. 
Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 192 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER,  supra note 19, at §744. 
375   Geir Ulfstein, Comment on Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns 
of Consent in Environmental Framework Agreements, in DEVELOPMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 145–6 (R. Wolfrum & V. Röben eds., 2005). 
376  See Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Gigiri, 
Kenya, Apr. 10–20, 2000, Conf. 11.1: Establishment of Committees, Rev. CoP14, 
amended by Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The 
Hague, Neth., June 3–15, 2007, CITES Strategic Vision: 2008–2013, Res. 14.2 
(establishing committees and specifying their general terms of reference). 
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regardless of whether those findings are considered enforcement 
decisions or not.  This omission can be contrasted with the Kyoto 
Protocol where it clearly states that compliance decisions “entailing 
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment 
to this Protocol.”377 
As for the discussion on the powers of the CSP, some of the 
negotiating states not only envisioned a stronger mechanism for 
review in terms of powers, but also perhaps in terms of legal effect.  
Algeria, for example, suggested that the CSP may have the power to 
take “action against a State,”378 although it is unclear what legal 
effect this proposal was meant to have. In any event, this suggestion 
was not adopted in the final draft of the treaty. Based on the 
preference for weaker powers in the area of consultations and 
cooperation, and the clear distinction between the CSP’s duties and 
amendment of the ATT, the legal effect was likely intended to be 
very limited. 
 
8.7. Subsequent agreement/practice 
 
A further consideration is whether decisions of the CSP could be 
treated as a “subsequent agreement”379  or “subsequent practice” of 
the parties within the meaning of the VCLT.380 
The VCLT provides that “subsequent agreements”381 between 
the parties shall be taken into account in interpreting the terms of 
the treaty.382 Practice on applying this provision of the VCLT does 
not exclude treaty regimes addressing arms-control.383  Subsequent 
agreements, although not specifically amending the treaty, can 
change the legal relationships between the parties and can amount 
to, de facto, treaty amendments.  Since there does not appear to be 
any required form for a subsequent agreement, and the word 
“agreement” has a broader meaning than “treaty,” we can consider 
                                                     
377  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 18. 
378  U.N. Secretariat, Compilations of views, May 14, 2012 (response of Alg., para. 
5, Mar. 29, 2012). 
379  VCLT, supra note 61, at art. 31(3)(a). 
380  Id. at art. 31(3)(b). 
381  Id. 
382  Id. 
383  Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 184, at part II  
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that the agreements of the States Parties to the ATT could inform our 
understanding of the treaty text.384  
The meaning of the term “agreement” has been widely 
interpreted to include resolutions as well as guidelines adopted by 
parties to the treaty.385  However, it is generally understood that 
while acts resulting from tacit acceptance do not amount to 
“subsequent agreements”, they can nonetheless contain an 
interpretation of the treaty.386  In some treaty regimes, it would 
appear that a qualifying “subsequent” or “additional” agreement 
must be adopted in the context of a review conference387 rather than 
a CSP.388  In the context of the WTO, the appellate body has, on 
                                                     
384
 See Daniel H. Joyner, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY 83 (2011), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/ 
displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8896498&fileId=S0165070X1200109X; 
Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 213–214 (2d ed. 2007), available 
at http://www.academia.edu/4376372/Anthony_Aust_-_Handbook_of_ 
International_Law_2nd_edition (relying on various agreements to provide context 
to the convention). 
385  See International Maritime Organization Sub-Division of Legal Affairs, 
Agenda item 4 (Ocean fertilization), Doc. LC 33/J/6, para. 3 (stating that “[t]his 
seems to indicate that, provided its intention is clear, the interpretation could take 
various forms, including a resolution adopted at a meeting of the parties, or even a 
decision recorded in the summary records of a meeting of the parties”); Montreal 
Protocol Fifteenth Meeting of the Parties, Dec. XV/3, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/9, 
chap. XVIII.A (describing obligations of the parties under amendments to the 
protocol). 
386  For provisions detailing how the body is to be examined see IMO, Sixteenth 
Consultative Meeting of the Contracting Parties, Res. LC.50 (16), Annex 4, Res. 
LC.51 (16), Annex 5,; IMO, Res. LDC.41 (13), para. 1; IMO, Dumping at sea: the 
evolution of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter (LC), 1972, FOCUS ON IMO (July 1997). 
387
 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan.: New Zealand 
Intervening), I.C.J., para. 46 (Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/148/18136.pdf (“[R]ecommendations, which take the form of 
resolutions, are not binding.  However, when they are adopted by consensus or by 
a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention or 
its Schedule.”); Biological Weapons ISU, Additional agreements reached by previous 
Review Conferences relating to each article of the Convention, Doc. 
BWC/CONF.VII/INF.5 (including an update to the understandings and 
agreements reached by that Conference, Geneva 2012). 
388  See, e.g., Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, arts. 7, 9; COP, 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Intergovernmental Negotiating Body 
on a Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, Revised Chairperson’s text on a 
protocol on illicit trade in tobacco products, and general debate: legal advice on the scope of 
the protocol, Note by the WHO Legal Counsel Doc. FCTC/COP/INB-
IT/3/INF.DOC./6,; R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 639; Brunnée, supra 
note 354, at 110–15; S.F. Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework 
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multiple occasions, treated the decisions of the Ministerial 
Conference as agreements of the States Parties.389  Of course, this 
conclusion would require the consent of all of the States Parties. 
This same understanding has also been applied to CSPs,390 and 
may have been part of the reasoning behind the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice in the Whaling in the Antarctic case.391  
Returning to the discussion on the Lac Wetland case, it is still unclear 
as whether the Dutch Crown had actual evidence of a unanimous 
vote or whether it conflated consensus with unanimity.  The 
difficulty here lies in distinguishing these agreements from those 
undertaken by the Review Conference as amendments to the treaty.  
It seems strange to carefully vest the Review Conference with the 
authority to amend the treaty while casually permit the CSP to 
adopt subsequent agreements with similar effect. 
Some commentators and at least one case suggest that 
interpretations of the treaty and other decisions by the CSP should 
be considered “subsequent practice” by the States Parties. Article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT states that it shall be taken into account, 
together with the context “[a]ny subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation”.392  
In the ICJ cases, the court found that practice had effectively 
modified the underlying treaties, however both cases concerned 
internal decision-making processes of U.N. organs.  The ICJ has 
recently held that decisions of treaty bodies on substantive 
obligations do not necessarily occur with the consent of all States 
Parties, and thus not all decisions can be treated as subsequent 
agreements or practice.393  But that was not the case in the past, 
where subsequent practice has created new external obligations.394  
                                                     
Convention on Tobacco Control: an analysis of guidelines adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties, 39 GEO. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 14–16 (2010). 
389  For examples of how a judicial body may use an agreement to a convention 
to imply an pact among the participating state see, e.g., US – Clove Cigarettes, Appl. 
Body Report, paras. 267–68 (“WTO Appl. Body”); EC – Bananas III, Second 
Recourse to Article 21.5, Appl. Body Report, para. 388 (WTO Appl. Body). 
390  See, e.g., R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 641; Verschuuren, 
Ramsar Soft Law Is Not Soft at All, supra note 365, at 2 (discussing the Lac Wetland 
case). 
391  Whaling in the Antarctic, 2014 ICJ Reps., supra note 298, para. 83. 
392    VCLT, supra note 61, at art 31(3)(b). 
393  Id.  
394   See infra note 307. 
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Here the GATT is instructive.  Initially the GATT was a treaty 
without an accompanying international organization, but over time 
and practice, an ad hoc, de facto organization grew up around the 
treaty.395  The GATT body then created new rules and altered 
existing ones in the GATT through practice.396 
Much of the foregoing applies equally to subsidiary bodies.  
Again, under general principles of international institutional law, 
the subsidiary bodies should not enjoy greater power than the 
principal organ. 397  Thus, if the CSP cannot legally bind the States 
Parties, then the subsidiary organs cannot do it as well. 
 
8.8. Obligation to cooperate 
 
Some treaties creating CSPs include legally binding obligations 
on the parties to cooperate with the CSP, for example in 
consultations on implementation and reporting.398 In this case, the 
CSP is the supreme body of the treaty and is given an explicit 
mandate to direct the activity of the Secretariat and other subsidiary 
bodies in whatever way it deems fit for a better implementation of 
the treaty.399 
In keeping with this practice, the ATT contains explicit 
obligations to report,400 though it is important to note that some of 
the reporting duties are not mandatory.401  But those are obligations 
arising from the treaty itself, not from the decisions of the CSP.  After 
all, these types of explicit obligations to report or cooperate exist 
                                                     
395  See infra note 307. 
396
 Decision of the Contracting Parties, Differential and More Favorable 
Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 
1979), B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 203 (1980). 
397  SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at §225. 
398  See Test-Ban Treaty, art. II(A)(5) (requiring each party to cooperate with the 
organization). See also UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 12 (binding the parties to 
obligations). 
399  See UNFCCC, supra note 11, at arts. 7–10.  See also Anti-Personnel Mines 
Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(7)–(15), 8(18) (providing for investigation). 
400  See ATT, supra note 1, arts. 11(6), 13 (explaining the measures to be applied 
with regards to diversion in art. 11(6) and stating the measures implemented in art. 
13). 
401  See, e.g., id. at arts. 13(2),(16) (encouraging, but not obligating parties to 
report). 
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even where a CSP is not being created.402  The ATT also contains 
obligations to cooperate.403 
These kinds of cooperation obligations are normal and need not 
be explicit, arising already from pacta sunt servanda.404  This principle 
appears in, inter alia, VCLT, article 26, which states that “[e]very 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith,”405 but the wording of the 
obligations suggests that the obligation to cooperate is owed to other 
States Parties, not necessarily to the CSP as such.  One view on such 
wording would be to see the CSP as the cooperation mechanism 
implicit in the general obligation to cooperate.  Thus, the member 
states may cooperate within the CSP, but this does not necessarily 
mean that such must cooperate with the CSP. 
However, drawing on principles of international institutional 
law, even when a constitutive instrument is silent on the duty to 
cooperate with the institution, the obligation is implied.406  It would 
appear that binding decisions could be binding in the cases where 
the state party consents to binding force,407 where the state abuses 
its legal rights and loses its right to refuse to comply,408 or where the 
state is bound by estoppel based upon its subsequent acts in 
compliance with the decision that other states rely on.409  To the 
                                                     
402  See, e.g., Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 184, at art. (V) 
(instructing States Parties of the Convention to consult one another and cooperate 
in solving problems that arise in relation to the objectives of the Convention and 
also states, “[c]onsultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be 
undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of 
the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter”). 
403  See ATT, supra note 1, art. 15(1) (obligating parties to cooperate consistent 
with their respective security interests and national laws). 
404   See VCLT, supra note 61, at art. 26. 
405  See also A. Aust, supra note 385, at 179–80(noting that the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda is regarded as “the fundamental principle of the law of treaties”). 
406  For examples of where a duty to cooperate can be implied see Voting 
Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory 
of South-west Africa, Adv. Op. 1955 ICJ Reps. 67, 118-19 (Lauterpacht) (June 7) 
(“Voting Proc. Case”); Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between 
the WHO and Egypt, Adv. Op., ICJ Reps. 73, 93, 95, 96, 97 (Dec. 20, 1980); Whaling 
in the Antarctic, 2014 I.C.J. Reps. para. 83. 
407
 See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Italy (agreeing to accept a UNGA 
recommendation as binding). 
408  See Voting Proc. Case, 1955 ICJ Reps. 120 (Lauterpacht) (explaining how 
the abuse of right might make a recommendation binding. 
409  See Georg Schwarzenberger & E. D. Brown, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (6th ed. 1976)(requiring the party to cooperate based on implied agreement 
through previous actions). 
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degree that the subsequent agreement argument above would fail, 
the estoppel argument might alternatively explain why the 
authorities in some cases inquired whether the state had voted in 
favor of the decision by the treaty body in the first place.410  Voting 
in favor of a decision might lead other states to rely on the voting 
state’s assurance that it would act accordingly. 
 
8.9. Customary international law 
 
Yet another means by which the acts of the CSP may take on 
binding legal effect is through the normal operation of customary 
international law. Provided that there is widespread and consistent 
state practice and opinio juris,411 some customary norms may emerge.  
The ICJ has already recognized that customary law may arise from 
a treaty regime, and even more on point may be evidenced by the 
decisions of international organizations,412 though that latter 
understanding appears limited to the UNGA.  Extensive discussion 
on this possibility will be omitted. 
 
8.10. Soft law 
 
In the alternative to “hard” customary international law, and 
considering the use of the term “recommendations,” some authors 
have suggested that the decisions adopted by a CSP could amount 
to “soft law.”413   Soft law is based on the argument that the full 
                                                     
410  See Verschuuren, Ramsar Soft Law Is Not Soft at All, supra note 278, at 2–5 
(describing how a judicial body used one sovereign’s compliance with an 
agreement as sufficient evident to imply agreement). 
411  See N. Sea Cont. Shelf cases (Germ. v. Den.; Germ. v. Neths.), Judgment, 
1969 ICJ REPS. 44 (showing how it is somewhat unclear whether the CSP decisions 
may be treated as practice or opinio juris, or even both). 
412  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Adv. Op., 1996 ICJ 
Reps. 226, paras. 70–71(“[UNGA resolutions] can, in certain circumstances, provide 
evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an 
opinio juris.”). 
413  For an examination of the actual benefits of certain international laws See, 
e.g., Brunnée, supra note 267, at 118–23; CITES COP, CITES Guidelines for Transport 
and Preparation for Shipment of Live Animals and Plants, Doc. Plen. 2.6 (Rev.), item XIX 
(1980); Consultative Meeting of the Parties to the London Convention that call for 
a moratorium on the dumping of radioactive waste (1983 and 1985); Ramsar COP 
Recomm. 2.3, Doc. C.4.12 (1984). 
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magnitude and variability of legal effect cannot be explained 
adequately with the usual binary law/non-law system.414 
For purposes of this article, we can simply observe that even if 
the decisions of the CSP would not have the typical “hard law” legal 
effect under any of the means described above, they would surely 
have some political consequences.415  This conclusion was precisely 
the opinion of the court in the National Resources Defense Council 
case.416  Along with claims to form hard law, the CSP will probably 
have some ability to shame non-complying states.417 
 
8.11. Countermeasures 
 
Lastly, even if there is no legal effect from certain CSP decisions, 
there is the possibility that states might want to impose sanctions or 
countermeasures on states that do not comply with the ATT.  This 
step of imposing sanctions might or might not be preceded by a CSP 
finding of non-compliance, assuming for the moment that the CSP 
can issues such findings. 
It could be that the ATT provides the only sanctions possible, 
though it is remarkably silent on the matter.  On the other hand, it 
could be that general international law continues to apply so that 
other states would have the power to impose countermeasures in 
cases of non-compliance.  For the purposes of this article, the author 
will continue to apply international institutional law insofar as the 
CSP functions as an institution. 
Furthermore, any material breach of the ATT in the sense of 
article 60 of the VCLT may also permit not only countermeasures in 
case of non-compliance, but also suspension or termination of the 
ATT.  Again, this article applies international institutional law from 
a functional perspective, and thus suspension or termination in case 
                                                     
414  For a discussion on the confusion surrounding the secondary effects of 
international law See, e.g., O. Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 
in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 9 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 
1971); R.Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It when We See It?, 
37 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 59 (1981)  
415  See generally R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, supra note 54, at 641; Brunnée, supra 
note 267, at 111). 
416  Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 8–10 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
417  See Montreal Protocol MOP Dec. VIII/24, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro8/12 (1996) 
(giving the CSP the ability to issue public statements regarding member states). 
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of material breach would be unlikely.  Institutional law 
contemplates cooperation continuing after breach.418 
 
9. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
 
In keeping with the unclear nature of the CSP as an international 
organization, a treaty organ without legal personality, or a quasi-
organization, it is also unclear whether the CSP and its employees 
and agents will benefit from privileges and immunities.  Generally, 
international organizations and the persons that undertake activities 
on behalf of such organizations benefit from privileges and 
immunities limited to their official acts,419  the well known as 
“functional immunity.”420 
Whether a regime has privileges and immunities is linked to the 
question of the legal personality of the regime, and whether or not 
the organ is an international organization.  That being said, there are 
some exceptions where certain states may grant immunities to 
important international NGOs,421 but in general, where the organ is 
lacking personality, the members would bear reasonability for the 
actions of the CSP.422 
The representatives to the CSP may benefit from personal 
and/or functional immunity as state officials, such as Heads of 
States, Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers, and perhaps 
                                                     
418  See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 19, at § 866 (discussing provisions 
controlling the post-breach actions). 
419  For discussions of the incentives of various privileges and immunities See, 
e.g., Branno v Ministry of War (Ct. Cass., Ital.) reprinted at 22 INT’L L. REPS. 756–57; 
Iran-US Claims Trib. v A.S. (Sup. Ct., Neths.) reprinted at 94 INT’L L. REPS. 321–30. 
420  August Reinisch, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 
206 (2000). 
421  See, e.g., The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, Hosting 
transition update, 2, available at (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=& 
esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gavi.o
rg%2Flibrary%2Fpublications%2Fgavi-progress-reports%2Fgavi-alliance-
progress-report-2010%2F&ei=jtgNVdnJGIbfsAT524LQDg&usg= 
AFQjCNGmQGq_W08ueMdsexiLsQEqjYaP5A&sig2=RHQlNckBbl7A4KcWCGg
QDA&bvm=bv.88528373,d.cWc) (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (detailing the acquisition 
of privileges and immunities under the Swiss Host State Act). 
422  See Int’l L. Comm’n, Giorgio Gaja, SPEC. RAPP., First report on responsibility 
of international organization, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532, 15 (describing the organization 
overseeing the organ as being ultimately responsible). 
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even “other high ranking officials.”423 However, discharge of the 
CSP functions by officers of this rank is unlikely and, thus, the 
category left open by the ICJ becomes significant.  In addition to 
personal immunity, the representatives might also have functional 
immunity by benefit of their role as state officers.  Notwithstanding 
the potential to enjoy immunity deriving from the state they 
represent, representatives might also enjoy immunity deriving from 
the CSP. 
Some arms-control treaty regime organs have received 
privileges and immunities that cover the organization (where an 
organization was created),424 delegates to the organization,425 staff of 
the organization,426 and even fact-finding experts.427  Where the 
immunities are not in the constitutive instrument, supplementary 
agreements can grant or clarify the immunities the organs and staff 
enjoy.428  These agreements were always covering the organization 
(where one is clearly created) or the Secretariat, not the CSP 
specifically. 
However, the UNOLA suggested that the CSP could simply 
adopt a decision providing for “the required juridical personality 
and legal capacity upon the Convention Secretariat and according it 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment 
of its purposes.”429  This is similar to the approach of the CSP of the 
Montreal Protocol in reaching an agreement with the host state for 
                                                     
423  See generally Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of Apr. 11, 2000 (DR 
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 ICJ Reps. 1. 
424  See, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, at art. (II)(E)(54)(creating the 
organization through the privileges and immunities granted by the treaty). 
425  See, e.g., id. at art. (II)(E)(55); Preparatory Commission Resolution, art. 22; 
Chemical Weapons Convention, art. (VIII)(D)(48), (49), Verification Annex, Pt. 
II(B)(detailing the privileges of the delegates to the convention). 
426  For examples of conventions that detail the privileges granted to the staff 
see, e.g., Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 17, art. (II)(E)(57); Preparatory Commission 
Resolution, art. 22; Chemical Weapons Convention, art. (VIII)(D)(48). 
427  See, e.g., Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(10) 
(providing procedure for the fact-finding experts). 
428  See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, art. (VIII)(D)(50); 
Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, June 20, 
1996, U.N.-Germany-UNFCCC Secretariat; Agreement Regulating Matters 
Resulting from the Establishment in Canada of the Multilateral Fund and Its 
Organs, Nov. 23, 1998, Canada-Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund (concerning 
only the fund established by the CSP, not the CSP itself) 
429   FCCC Arrangements for relocation 1996, supra note 57 at para. 11(2). 
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privileges and immunities for its multilateral fund.430  Presumably, 
if the CSP can grant the Secretariat immunities by simple decision, 
then the CSP must itself enjoy immunity (or perhaps be able to enjoy 
immunity by simple decision of the States Parties at a Review 
Conference).  This way it might seem that privileges and immunities 
are potentially available. 
 
10.   CONCLUSION 
 
This article has surveyed the practices of several various treaty 
organs in order to reach an understanding of how international 
institutional law applies to this relatively recent phenomenon.   As 
a case study, it has looked at the new ATT treaty organs in order to 
find their place in international institutional law, and comment on 
the likely application of international institutional law to its organs. 
Treaty organs have evolved considerably from their early, 
primarily bureaucratic, role into significant international actors. 
Although they might not be true international organizations, and 
must suffer designation “quasi”, they are not completely exempt 
from the increasingly coherent field of international institutional 
law.  The ATT treaty organs are no exception from such rules and 
the initial steps towards constituting these organs show every sign 
that they will fall into the existing mold.  Increasingly the “quasi” 
designation may become more distracting, as we move to the 
functional application of the corpus of international institutional 
law.  
 
 
 
                                                     
430  See Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the Work of Its 
Second Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/9, para. 66(c)(describing the treatment 
of the mutual fund under the convention). 
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